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The federal income tax system has served the United States reasonably well
for some nine decades.' The income tax system is based on a tax fairness theory
that the federal tax burden should be allocated on the basis of each taxpayer's
ability to pay tax and that a taxpayer's income is an appropriate reflection of his
or her ability to pay.2 For all its problems (including declining taxpayer
compliance and an understaffed and underfunded tax collection agency), this
system enables the U.S. Treasury to collect significant amounts of revenue, at
comparatively low administrative costs, for use in funding the U.S. government's
direct expenditure programs.3 Yet, during the past decade, this system has been
under an unrelenting attack from some members of Congress, economists,
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1. The modem federal income tax system essentially began with the ratification of the Sixteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1913 and the subsequent enactment of the Revenue Act of 1913.
Although there has been significant tax legislation throughout the period since 1913, the three most fundamental
tax bills relating to the income tax occurred with the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
2. See, e.g., JOSEPH M. DODGE, J. CLIFTON FLEMING, JR. & DEBORAH A. GEIER, FEDERAL INCOME
TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE AND POLICY 24-25, 30-32 (2d ed. 1999). The theoretical ideal for an income-
based or accretion-based tax system is based on the work of economists Schanz, Haig, and Simons (sometimes
called the Schanz-Haig-Simons model or the Haig-Simons model). Under that model, the income tax base
would include both consumption and savings (i.e., the change in the fair market value of the taxpayer's property
rights during the taxable year). Our current income tax system is, of course, not a theoretically pure income-
based system and contains many departures from this theoretical model, including some features that reflect a
consumption tax approach. Thus, it is more accurate to describe our system as a hybrid income-based system.
3. The U.S. tax system collects more money than any other tax system in the world and probably does so
at the lowest administrative costs of any major system in the world. See, e.g., N. Jerold Cohen, Remarks at the
College of William & Mary's Annual Tax Conference (Dec. 6-7, 1996), in TAX ANALYSTS' DAILY TAX
HIGHLIGHTS & DOCUMENTS, Dec. 18, 1996, at 2942. This fact should be kept in mind as we seriously consider
other altematives to the current income tax system.
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business leaders, tax academicians,' and even Treasury Department tax policy
officials in the current Bush Administration, 5 who argue that the system is near
collapse and that a radical overhaul of the system is required.
Many of these politicians and commentators go so far as to argue that the
system needs to be replaced by a national sales tax or other consumption-based
tax system. 6 One prominent version of these proposals, the Hall-Rabushka Flat
Tax,7 is often mislabeled as a flat-rate income tax, when in fact it represents a
form of consumption-based tax system with only one nominal rate.8 One
supposed selling point of this and other "flat tax" plans is that a taxpayer's tax
return could fit on a postcard. However, of course, a significant number of U.S.
taxpayers already use the equivalent of a post-card return on the Form 1040A or
Form 1040EZ, both of which are quite simple, and a significant number of
taxpayers who file the Form 1040 have a relatively simple return, using the
4. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX (1997); MICHAEL J.
GRAETZ, THE U.S. INCOME TAX: WHAT IT Is, How IT GOT THAT WAY, AND WHERE WE GO FROM HERE
(1999) [hereinafter GRAETZ, WHERE Do WE GO FROM HERE]; Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary
Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 112 YALE L.J. 261 (2002) [hereinafter Graetz, A Fresh Start].
Professor Graetz has offered an intriguing proposal to replace the current income tax system, estate and gift tax
system, and Social Security (i.e., payroll) tax with the following: (1) a 10-15 percent federal credit-method,
value added tax; (2) a 20-25 percent individual income tax that applies only to people with incomes in excess of
$100,000 ($50,000, in the case of an unmarried taxpayer), treating large testamentary and inter vivos gratuitous
transfers as income, and (3) a 20-25 percent corporate income tax. See GRAETZ, WHERE Do WE GO FROM
HERE, supra, at 303-14; Graetz, A Fresh Start. This proposal recognizes, among other things, that most
individual taxpayers whose incomes are under $100,000 consume currently a large part of their incomes, so that
for those taxpayers an income-based system and a consumption-based system could produce substantially the
same tax base. The payroll tax is a significant burden for these taxpayers so the Graetz proposal might well
reduce the overall federal tax burden for many taxpayers at this income level. By retaining a significant income
tax for those whose incomes exceed $100,000, the Graetz proposal, unlike many consumption tax proposals,
retains a progressive distribution of the federal tax burden that reflects ability-to-pay considerations. There are
numerous technical questions about the Graetz proposal as well as policy criticisms that can be made about
various aspects of it (e.g., why not use a two- or three-rate income tax instead of a single rate, but keep the top
rate under 30 percent?), but it certainly presents an interesting alternative to the current system.
5. For example, on March 10, 2003, at a conference sponsored by the Federal Bar Association, Pamela
Olson, then Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy in the Administration of George W. Bush, hyperbolically
stated her belief that the federal income tax code is so complex that "the system is nearing collapse." Alison
Bennett, Olson Defends Bush Dividend Proposal, Urges Simplification of Corporate Tax Rules, BNA DAILY TAX
REP., Mar. 11, 2003, at G-1. Such overstatements by government officials in charge of the tax system are not
helpful.
6. See, e.g., LAWRENCE SEIDMAN, THE USA TAX (1997).
7. ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995). The Hall-Rabushka Flat Tax
appears deceptively simple and all of its provisions fit on a small number of printed pages. However, this
simplicity is deceptive because the Hall-Rabushka Flat Tax is short on definitions, apparently delegating that
difficult but necessary task to the Treasury and the courts (which delegation, of course, involves separation-of-
powers and allocation-of-powers issues). Moreover, the Hall-Rabushka Flat Tax proposal contains virtually no
procedural or administrative provisions, which, of course, would have to be added if the proposal were to be
enacted into law. It is unclear whether these omissions are intended to mislead or represent an economist's
inability to translate his or her ideas into a workable system of legal rules.
8. The Hall-Rabushka Flat Tax, like most so-called flat tax proposals, is not really a single-rate system
because it contains a generous personal exemption, which exempts a certain amount of income from the tax
and, therefore, creates a bracket of income with a zero rate of tax. It would be more accurate to describe it as a
"flatter" tax proposal.
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standard deduction (instead of itemizing deductions). 9 The Bush Administration
seems headed in the direction of a consumption-based tax system with its
proposals to provide several new savings initiatives,'0 to exempt most corporate
dividends from taxation at the shareholder level," and to provide more rapid
depreciation and increase the expensing of depreciable business assets.'2 In
addition to these legislative proposals, the Bush Treasury Department has issued
proposed regulations that allow many types of intangible expenditures with
significant future benefits to be treated as current expenses rather than capital
expenditures, a treatment more consistent with a consumption-based system than
an income-based system. '3 Taken together, these legislative proposals and
9. See IRS, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN, Winter 2002-2003 Publication 1136 (Rev. 4-2003)
(indicating that of 130,456,253 individual income tax returns filed in 2001, 50,112,314, approximately 38%,
were returns on Form 1040A or 1040EZ; also indicating that approximately 65 percent of the individual income
tax returns filed in 2001 used the standard deduction). Perhaps the IRS has hesitated in putting the Form
1040EZ return on a post-card because it does not want to cause eyestrain for the taxpayers who would have fill
it out or the IRS personnel who would have to process it.
10. See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2004
REVENUE PROPOSALS 118-127 (Feb. 2003) [hereinafter GENERAL EXPLANATION OF BUSH PROPOSALS].
11. See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF BUSH PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 11-22. Congress did not enact
this proposal in 2003. Instead, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (the "2003 Act")
added Section 1 (h)(l 1) to the Code. In the case of noncorporate taxpayers, Section 1(h)(l 1) reduces the double
tax on corporate earnings by treating "qualified dividend income" as "net capital gain" for purposes of section
1(h) only. The net result is that such dividend income, while remaining ordinary income for most purposes in
the Code (including the capital loss limitation in section 1211), is taxed at the preferential tax rates applicable to
long-term capital gains-namely, under current law, 15 percent for taxpayers whose other income is taxed at
rates of 25 percent or higher and 5 percent (0 percent for taxable years starting after 2007) for taxpayers whose
other income is taxed at rates of 15 percent or below. Section l(h)(1 1) sunsets in 2009, i.e., the provision will
no longer apply for taxable years starting after 2008, unless Congress extends the effective date in subsequent
tax legislation. Integration of the corporate and individual tax systems is consistent with either an
income/accretion-based tax system following the Schanz-Haig-Simons ideal or a consumption-based tax
system, although a number of commentators have developed theoretical defenses of the corporate income tax.
See authorities cited infra note 56. Stated differently, double taxation of corporate earnings is not consistent
with either an income-based or consumption-based tax system. Nonetheless, given the context in which the
Bush Administration is advancing this dividend exemption proposal, it is fair to describe it as part of the
Administration's push for a consumption-based tax system.
12. In 2002, Congress enacted the Bush Administration's proposals for more rapid depreciation in the
hope that these provisions would serve as an economic stimulus that helps pull the economy out of recession.
See Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, 116 Stat. 21, § 101(a) (adding the
original bonus depreciation provisions in Section 168(k) to the Code). In a tax giveaway bidding war in 2003,
Congress enacted provisions giving taxpayers even more generous depreciation deductions than were in the
Bush Administration's original 2003 proposals. See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752, § 201 (amending Section 168(k) of the Code), 202 (amending Section 179(b)
of the Code). For a spirited critique of the bonus depreciation provisions in the 2003 Act, see Calvin H.
Johnson, Depreciation Policy During Carnival: The New 50 Percent Bonus Depreciation, 100 TAX NOTES 713
(2003) (arguing that these provisions give taxpayers a negative tax of 27 percent for debt-financed equipment
that is roughly equivalent to the government paying 27 percent of the cost of depreciable equipment purchased
by taxpayers). As Professor Johnson points out, by creating a negative tax rate on debt-financed equipment,
these 2003 Act provisions do serious economic harm by making inferior investments look attractive. id. at 714.
13. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4, 67 Fed. Reg. 77701 (Dec. 19, 2002). These proposed regulations
purport to interpret the Supreme Court's decision in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992),
which held that intangible expenditures providing a taxpayer with significant future benefits have to be
capitalized (instead of currently deducted), notwithstanding that such expenditures do not create or enhance a
separate and distinct asset. However, the proposed regulations basically adopt the industry/taxpayer position on
2004 / Tax Reform Interrupted
administrative actions seem to signal the Bush Administration's intent to
abandon the income tax and attempt to shift the federal tax system toward a more
consumption-based approach. The Administration, however, to date has failed to
overtly present a comprehensive consumption-based reform proposal. Instead,
the Administration has made piecemeal proposals with a consumption-tax flavor
that if enacted would amount to a poorly designed partial consumption tax
system.
The thesis of this article is that, to paraphrase Mark Twain, the reports of the
death of the income tax system are much exaggerated. 4 It has significant
problems to be sure, but we should not forget that our income tax system remains
in many ways the envy of the world. The system needs to deal with a continuing
decline in corporate tax payments due in part to corporate tax avoidance and (in
some cases) tax evasion, including the cancerous corporate tax shelter problem. It
needs modernized and expanded enforcement and collection capabilities. And it
desperately needs reform and simplification of its increasingly complicated
provisions. But that is a far cry from saying that it "should be torn out by its
roots" and replaced in its entirety with some kind of unproven consumption tax
or other alternative tax system.
Congress should reject attempts by the Bush Administration to adopt a
consumption tax by incremental steps without undertaking a careful study of this
issue, developing a proposal for an overall consumption tax system, and
disclosing and discussing the pros and cons of such a proposal. Moreover, any
proposed new tax system needs to be revenue neutral or raise more revenue than
the current system does, not lose roughly $675 billion over ten years" as the
Bush Administration's original 2003 tax proposals would have done.'
6
most of the issues that have come up after the INDOPCO decision and attempt to construe the capitalization
mandate of INDOPCO as narrowly as possible. Allowing a current deduction for what is essentially a capital
expenditure is consistent with a consumption-based tax system but inconsistent with an income-based system.
The future value portion of a capital expenditure is savings or investment, which should be included in the tax
base if one is using an income-based system but excluded if one is using a consumption-based system. For
spirited critiques of these proposed regulations, see Calvin H. Johnson, Destroying Tax Base: The Proposed
INDOPCO Capitalization Regulations, 99 TAX NOTES 1381 (2003); Lee A. Sheppard, Bringing the Separate-
Asset Test Back from the Dead, 97 TAX NOTES 1655 (2002). For other commentary on these proposed
regulations, see Laurence M. Bambino & Richard M. Nugent, The Proposed INDOPCO Regulations: A Primer,
99 TAX NOTES 259 (2003). These proposed regulations were modified and issued in final form in December
2003. See T.D. 9107, 2004-7 I.R.B. 447.
14. The modest aim of this article is to discuss why I think that the Bush Administration's tax proposals
are fundamentally flawed and that a more deliberate tax reform process is necessary. This article is not intended
to be a comprehensive discussion of the pros and cons of a consumption base versus an income base.
15. This is probably a conservative estimate that understates the revenue losses that would come from tax
planning moves designed to take advantage of the new savings initiatives as well as the Bush Administration's
dividend exemption proposal. Moreover, the revenue loss from the savings proposals would increase over time
because in the early years potential revenue losses are exceeded by the revenue gains from taxpayers shifting funds
from tax-deductible savings vehicles to after-tax savings vehicles the income from which is exempt from income
tax.
16. It was estimated that the Bush Administration's original 2003 tax proposals also would have caused
states to lose up to $64 billion in tax revenues over a ten-year period at a time when most states were in fiscal
crisis, partly as a result of the 2001 tax law changes and mostly as a result of the weak economy. See Iris J. Lay,
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The Reagan Administration's tax reform efforts are the way to proceed. Start
with a carefully thought out academic study of how to proceed, which sets forth
all of the options and frankly and fully discusses the pros and cons of each option
(including various consumption-based systems)." Then develop a proposal based
on that study, which reflects some (but not too much) compromise based largely
on issues of administrative feasibility.'8 Next, build public support for tax reform
through public hearings and town hall meetings regarding the reform proposals.
The philosophy of the Reagan tax reform effort was to retain the income tax
system, but broaden the base of the tax system by eliminating tax preferences and
lower marginal tax rates, thereby simplifying the system and enhancing its
fairness and economic efficiency.' 9 Those tax reform efforts resulted in what is
one of the best pieces of tax legislation ever enacted-namely, the Tax Reform
Act of 1986.2o
The 1986 Act was certainly not perfect by any means. It was defective in a
number of respects, some of which I will mention here. First, it continued the
tendency of Congress to enact separate limitations on total deductions arising
from a particular activity instead of eliminating or reforming the underlying
deductions themselves,2' thus increasing the complexity of the tax system.
Second, it missed an opportunity to do something about corporate integration,
President's Tax Proposals Would Reduce State Revenues by $64 Billion over 10 Years, 27 STATE TAX NOTES
521 (2003). The estimated state revenue loss from the 2003 Bush proposals resulted from the fact that most
states have "piggyback" state income tax systems, which use federal adjusted gross income as the starting point
for determining the state tax base. For such states, federal tax changes that reduce federal adjusted gross
income, such as the President's dividend exclusion proposal, the increased expensing of depreciable assets by
small businesses, and proposed consolidation of employer-based retirement savings accounts, reduce the state
tax bases as well.
17. See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1984)
(vols. 1-3) [hereinafter TREASURY I].
18. From a strategic point of view, it is best to start out with a relatively pure proposal because whatever
is proposed will be further compromised through the tax legislative process.
19. See TREASURY I, supra note 17, at 37-43; U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO
THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY 1-8 (May 1985).
20. Pub. L. No. 99-514 (1986).
21. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 469 (2002). Although the passive loss rules of Section 469 were successful in
shutting down the most prevalent tax shelters of the 1980s, they had a number of policy problems and certainly
did not end the use of tax shelters by all taxpayers. See Joseph Bankman, The Case Against Passive
Investments: A Critical Appraisal of the Passive Loss Restrictions, 42 STAN. L. REV. 15 (1989); Mona L.
Hymel, Tar Policy and the Passive Loss Rules: Is Anybody Listening?, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 615 (1998); Robert J.
Peroni, A Policy Critique of the Section 469 Passive Loss Rules, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1988); Lawrence
Zelenak, When Good Preferences Go Bad: A Critical Analysis of the Anti-Tax Shelter Provisions of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, 67 TEX. L. REV. 499 (1989); cf Daniel N. Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1189 (1989). But see Calvin H. Johnson, Why Have Anti-Tax Shelter Legislation? A
Response to Professor Zelenak, 67 TEX. L. REV. 591 (1989); Cecily W. Rock & Daniel N. Shaviro, Passive
Losses and the Improvement of Net Income Measurement, 7 VA. TAX REV. I (1987). For example, Section 469
does not prevent the use of passive losses from one shelter investment to offset the passive income from another
shelter investment. Moreover, the passive loss rules do not apply to corporate taxpayers (except in a modified
way to certain closely held C corporations) and, not surprisingly, corporations are the primary customers for tax
shelter products today. These modem tax shelter products are in many ways more sophisticated than the tax
shelters of the 1980s and Section 469 has had no'significant effect on them.
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ending the double taxation of corporate earnings, and, exacerbated the bias
against the corporate form by increasing taxes on corporations to pay in part for
the individual rate cuts. Third, it brought into the tax code the section 67 two-
percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions22 and a rate schedule bump to
phase out the benefits of the 15% rate bracket for high-income taxpayers, both of
which amounted to hidden marginal rate increases that applied to some
taxpayers.23 Fourth, it did little about reforming the treatment of debt in the tax
system, except that the interest deduction was substantially limited for
noncorporate taxpayers (which did remove some of the incentive in the income tax
system for borrowing). Fifth, it eliminated the capital gain preference, perhaps the
single biggest source of complexity in the tax system, but did so effectively only
on a temporary basis. That meant that the preference could easily reappear again,
as it did just four years later in 1990 when the first President Bush signed into
law the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990.24 The 1990 Act raised the top
individual marginal rate to 31% and thereby reinstated the capital gain preference
at a preferential rate of 28%. The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 199325 and the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 199726 then proceeded to increase the complexity of the
capital gain preference by creating several different preferential capital gains
rates. Finally, the 1986 Act reformulated the alternative minimum tax rules into a
substantial side-by-side alternative tax system to our regular income tax system.
Although done with meritorious motives, this move added substantial complexity to
the tax system and created an alternative system that threatens to engulf the regular
22. Pub. L. No. 99-154, § 132(a) (1986). To be fair, Congress intended section 67 as an indirect way of
disallowing deductions that it viewed as of questionable validity. For example, section 67 has the effect of
disallowing the deduction for unreimbursed employee business expenses, which Congress thought was often
erroneously claimed by taxpayers. Of course, the direct solution to that problem is to increase the substantiation
requirements for employee business expenses, not disallow the deduction for such expenses indirectly through a
floor. Alternatively, if Congress thought the abuses to be great, it could amend section 162 to provide that
employee business expenses are not deductible unless they are reimbursed. The other targets of section 67 are
section 212(1) and (2) expenses that are not related to rent or royalty income and section 212(3) expenses
relating to tax preparation, planning, and litigation. If Congress wants to disallow deductions for such expenses,
it should amend section 212 to so provide. Using a floor instead of the direct disallowance-of-deduction
approach is less effective and adds complexity to the tax system, but allows Congress to attempt to avoid some
political accountability for the tax change.
23. The 1986 Act changed the individual rate schedule in section 1 to contain only two explicit rates:
15% and 28%. The phase-out of the 15% bracket for high-income taxpayers was accomplished through the use
of a 5% surcharge on income within a certain range, which resulted in an effective marginal rate of 33% (28%
plus 5%) on income within that range. The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 10 1-508, 104 Stat.
1388, added a new 31% rate and eliminated the 5% surcharge to phase-out the benefits of the 15% bracket for
high-income taxpayers, but added two new phase-out provisions that increase the effective marginal rates of
some high-income taxpayers with income above a specified amount and within certain ranges-namely, the
section 68 three-percent-of-adjusted-gross-income phase-out of itemized deductions and the section 151 (d)(3)
phase-out of the personal exemption deductions.
24. Pub. L. No. 101-508. The tax reform lesson is clear-temporary fixes do not work well.
25. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
26. Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788.
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tax system for a significant number of taxpayers within a few years, unless
something is done to remedy this problem.
Remedying these and other defects in the 1986 Act and in subsequent tax
legislation enacted in the first Bush Administration and the Clinton Administration
should be part of the agenda for the next major tax reform effort. However, the Bush
tax bills actually enacted by Congress in 2001,27 2002,28 and 200329 had a significant
negative effect on the prospect for fundamental tax reform. The 2001 Act allocated a
substantial share of the then projected budget surpluses for uses only tangentially
related to tax reform and simplification (most prominently, the tax rate cuts in the
bill), making less revenue available for future tax reform efforts. Those projected
surpluses are now gone and have been replaced with significant projected budget
deficits for the foreseeable future. The 2002 and 2003 tax acts further increased those
projected budget deficits. This makes future tax reform and simplification efforts
more difficult because, for tax reform to be politically viable, it is often necessary to
include tax cuts as part of the reform package to reduce the number of taxpayers who
have increased taxes as part of the reform effort.3"
To be completely fair, the 2001 and 2003 tax acts did achieve some measure
of simplification. First, the 2001 Act simplified the earned income tax credit in
section 32, by simplifying the definitions of earned income and a qualifying child
for purposes of the credit and simplifying the ridiculously complicated
calculation of the credit. These changes achieve tax simplification for low-
income taxpayers.
Second, the 2001 Act repealed the estate tax provisions over a period of ten
years, with actual repeal taking place in 2010. This change eventually will be a
simplification move, but only if the sunset provisions of the 2001 Act are
repealed and the estate tax repeal becomes permanent.3' However, there are other
efficiency and equity issues that make repeal of the estate and gift tax provisions
32a controversial and questionable tax policy move.
27. The title of this tax act is the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 [hereinafter EGTRRA].
28. As earlier noted, the title of this tax act is the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002. See
supra note 12.
29. As earlier noted, the title of this tax act is the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2003. See supra note 12.
30. WILLIAM G. GALE, TAX SIMPLIFICATION: ISSUES AND OPTIONS (July 17, 2001) (Brookings
Institution publication of revised testimony of William G. Gale before the House Committee on Ways and
Means on July 17, 2001).
31. As is true of all of the 2001 Act provisions, the estate tax repeal provision sunsets at the end of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901, and, unless made permanent in some other tax bill (as is proposed by the Bush
Administration in its 2003 tax proposals), the estate and gift tax provisions as in place prior to the 2001 Act will
become law again in 2011. The 2001 Act sunsets in this way because President Bush could get more than fifty
votes in support of the bill in the Senate, but not the supermajority sixty votes needed to cut off debate on
permanent tax cuts. This is a shameful way to legislate and President Bush should have been able to reach
agreement with congressional leaders of both political parties on a tax proposal that could be enacted into law
on a permanent basis.
32. Any further discussion of the repeal of the estate and gift tax provisions in the 2001 Act is beyond
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Third, the 2001 Act repealed the section 68 overall limitation on itemized
deductions and the section 151(d)(3) phase-out of the personal exemption
deductions. These phase-outs represent hidden marginal rate increases for the
taxpayers to whom they apply, which add significant complexity to the tax
system.33 Unfortunately, two features of the 2001 Act substantially limited the
simplification potential of these changes. One is that the Act did nothing about
another phase-out provision-the section 67 two-percent floor on miscellaneous
itemized deductions. That provision subjects certain of a taxpayer's itemized
deductions to a two-percent-of-adjusted-gross-income floor, including a
taxpayer's expenses of the trade or business of being an employee. The second is
that the 2001 Act only phases these provisions out over time, instead of
eliminating them immediately for the 2001 tax year.4 This was presumably done
to minimize the revenue effects of eliminating the phase-out provisions. It also
allows Congress to hedge its bet, as it were, and possibly prevent the repeal from
ever taking place, or further delay the effective date of the phase-out repeal
provisions, if Congress decides it needs additional revenue and does not want to
raise that revenue more directly by further base broadening or rate increases. This
approach to tax legislation breeds public cynicism toward the tax legislative
process and the tax system. Any new tax legislation should move up the effective
date of the phase-out repeal provisions. Moreover, serious thought should be
given to repealing the two-percent floor in section 67 as well.
the scope of this article. For a sampling of the commentary on the pros and cons of estate tax repeal, including
the economic considerations, see RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (William G. Gale, James R. Hines
& Joel Slemrod eds., 2001); AICPA Tax Division, Reform of the Estate and Gift Tax System, 91 TAX NOTES
307 (2001); Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1990); John E. Donaldson, The
Future of Transfer Taxation: Repeal, Restructuring and Refinement, or Replacement, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
539 (1993); Joel Friedman & Andrew Lee, Estate Tax Repeal Would Be Costly, Yet Benefit Only a Few, 95 TAX
NOTES 1984 (2002); William G. Gale & Joel Slemrod, The Estate Tax: Not Dead Yet, 93 TAX NOTES 807
(2001); Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not To Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259 (1983); Harry L.
Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes After ERTA, 69 VA. L. REV. 1183 (1983); Edward J.
McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283 (1994); Martin A. Sullivan,
Estate Tax Repeal Will Create 200,000 Jobs-Or Will It?, 100 TAX NOTES 11 (2003); Stephen Vasek, Death
Tax Repeal: Alternative Reform Proposals, 92 TAX NOTES 955 (2001); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Straight Talk
About the 'Death' Tax: Politics, Economics, and Morality, 89 TAX NOTES 1159 (2000).
33. See, e.g., Glenn E. Coven, Congress as Indian-Giver: "Phasing Out" Tax Allowances Under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 6 VA. TAX REV. 505 (1987); Calvin H. Johnson, Simplification: Replacement
of the Section 68 Limitation on Itemized Deductions, 78 TAX NOTES 89 (1998); Robert J. Peroni, Reform in the
Use of Phase-Outs and Floors in the Individual Income Tax System, 91 TAX NOTES 1415 (2001); William D.
Popkin, Phantom Tax Rates, 78 TAX NOTES 1409 (1998). But see Reed Shuldiner & David Shakow, Lessons
From the Limitation on Itemized Deductions, 93 TAX NOTES 673 (2001) (concluding that the section 68 limit is
equivalent to an increase in marginal tax rates on adjusted gross incomes for most taxpayers subject to the limit,
but that for a significant portion of taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes in excess of $1 million, section 68
operates as a true restriction on itemized deductions; also concluding that the standard deduction acts as an
empirically important limitation on section 68).
34. In addition, as is true of all of the 2001 Act provisions, this phase-out of the phase-out provisions
sunsets at the end of 2010, and, unless made permanent in some other tax bill (as was proposed by the Bush
Administration in its 2003 tax proposals), the tax system as in place prior to the 2001 Act will become law
again in 2011 and the phase-out provisions will become law again.
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Fourth, by reducing (but not eliminating) temporarily the shareholder-level
tax on dividends paid to noncorporate shareholders, the 2003 Act reduced the
double tax on corporate earnings. This reduction in the double tax on corporate
earnings should simplify the tax system by reducing the importance of the
distinction between dividend distributions and redemptions of stock treated as
sale or exchanges of the shareholder's stock and by reducing the tax bias in favor
of debt financing (instead of equity financing) of corporations. However, this
legislative change does nothing to help mitigate the corporate tax shelter
problem. Dividends paid by a corporation to noncorporate shareholders are taxed
at the lower capital gains rates without regard to whether the earnings out of
which they are paid bore any tax at the corporate level.
Nevertheless, the 2001 and 2003 tax acts were largely significant steps in the
wrong direction and certainly did not help the cause of fundamental tax reform.
Those missteps in tax policy are likely to continue with two Bush tax proposals
that were not enacted in 2003 but are likely to resurrected in subsequent tax
proposals by the Administration-the dividend exemption proposal and the
proposals for new tax-favored savings vehicles.
II. CORPORATE INTEGRATION WITHOUT FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S DIVIDEND EXEMPTION PROPOSAL
Under current law, the earnings of a corporation are, at least theoretically,
subject to two levels of tax, one at the corporate level and a second at the
shareholder level. 5 The shareholder-level tax is imposed either on corporate
distributions to the shareholder (which for the years 2003-2008 are taxed to
individual shareholders at the lower capital gains rates and thereafter are taxed at
ordinary income rates if the distribution is a dividend 6 and at the lower capital
gain rates if the distribution qualifies as a sale or exchange redemption 37) or on
the shareholder's gain from the sale of the stock (which normally qualifies for the
lower capital gains rates).38 As discussed below, this double taxation of corporate
earnings generates economic inefficiencies and is inequitable, leading to
proposals to eliminate the double tax and "integrate" the corporate and individual
income tax systems. In fact, however, large amounts of economic income earned
by corporations is not subject to any tax at the corporate level, due to corporate
tax preferences, corporate tax sheltering activity, and defects in the corporate tax
35. This approach to taxing corporate earnings is sometimes referred to as the "classical" system for
taxing corporations. For studies of corporate integration, see U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTEGRATION OF THE
INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 39-58 (1992) [hereinafter U.S.
TREAS. DEP'T, TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE]; FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTEGRATION OF THE
INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXES (ALl 1993).
36. If the shareholder is a corporation, the corporation may not be taxed on the dividend or taxed on only
a portion of the dividend by reason of a 70%, 80%, or 100% dividends-received deduction. See I.R.C. § 243.
37. See id. §§ 302, 303, 1221, 1222, l(h).
38. See id. §§ 61(a)(3), 1221, 1222, l(h).
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accounting provisions in the Code.3 9 And, the supposed second, shareholder-level
tax may be either nonexistent or minimal (in the case of stock held by tax-exempt
charitable organizations or tax-deferred pension funds, or by foreign persons who
pay a reduced tax on dividends under tax treaties and generally pay no tax on
their capital gains from stock sales) or at the low capital gains rates (in the case
of taxable individual shareholders). These facts make corporate integration a less
compelling and less appealing tax policy agenda item than would otherwise be
the case.
In addition, despite the positive effects of corporate integration (discussed
below), integration proposals have gone nowhere over the years. There are three
primary reasons. First, there is an agency problem vis- -vis managers and
shareholders of a publicly traded corporation, namely, that managers want to retain
earnings for use in corporate projects and not pay dividends and the double tax on
corporate earnings creates a tax disincentive for shareholders to demand dividends.
4
0
Thus, historically the managements of publicly traded corporations have not been big
supporters of corporate integration proposals and some believe that this opposition
will continue to serve to undermine the Bush Administration's dividend exemption
proposal.' Second, there are an increasing number of alternative forms of business
entity that combine some corporate attributes (e.g., limited liability) with a single
level of tax, such as limited partnerships, limited liability partnerships, and limited
liability companies. The proliferation of these types of entities over the years has
reduced the pressure to adopt an integration proposal. Third, closely held
corporations have alternative, "self-help" methods of achieving a single level of tax
through payment of deductible salary, rent, or interest to shareholders who work for,
lease property to, or lend money to the corporation. Accordingly, small business
owners, who have a potent political lobby, may not care that much about corporate
integration. Thus, these political realities mean that the Administration's dividend
exemption proposal will continue to face an uphill struggle to be enacted in anything
like the form it was presented in the Bush Administration's 2003 tax proposals.
39. See MIHIR A. DESAI, THE CORPORATE PROFIT BASE, TAX SHELTERING ACTIVITY, AND THE
CHANGING NATURE OF EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION, NBER WORKING PAPER NO. 8866 (Apr. 2002) (stating
that "the regression evidence suggests that efforts by firms to circumvent tax payments are becoming more
significant, cheaper to implement, and harder to detect"); Joel Friedman & Robert Greenstein, Exempting
Corporate Dividends From Individual Income Taxes, TAX NOTES TODAY, 4-33, Jan. 7, 2003; William G. Gale
& Peter R. Orszag, The Administration's Proposal to Cut Dividend and Capital Gains Taxes, 98 TAX NOTES
415, 416 (2003); Robert McIntyre, New Gang, Old Myths, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Jan. 13, 2003; Gretchen
Morgenson, Waiting for the President to Pass the Tax-Cut Gravy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003.
40. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE
L.J. 325 (1995); Steven A. Bank, Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the Rise of Double Taxation, 44
WM. & MARY L. REV. 167 (2002); John K. McNulty, Reform of the Individual Income Tax by Integration of the
Corporate Income Tax, 46 TAX NOTES 1445, 1446 (1990); James R. Repetti, Corporate Governance and
Stockholder Abdication: Missing Factors in Tax Policy Analysis, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 971, 1034-35
(1992); Herwig J. Schlunk, The Zen of Corporate Capital Structure Neutrality, 99 MICH. L. REV. 410, 411 n.8
(2000).
41. See Martin A. Sullivan, Dividend Djb Vu: Will Double Tax Relief Get Canned-Again?, 98 TAx
NOTES 645 (2003).
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Nevertheless, Glenn Hubbard, the former chair of the Council of Economic
Advisers in the current Bush Administration and a top Treasury official in the
first Bush Administration, who had worked on corporate integration in that
Administration, developed a corporate integration proposal that had become one
of the centerpieces of the President's tax proposals for 2003.2 The proposal
would allow a corporation to distribute nontaxable dividends to its shareholders
to the extent that the dividends are paid out of earnings that have been taxed at
the corporate level. 3 This proposal would apply to both publicly traded and
closely held corporations.
Under this proposal, for each year, a corporation would calculate an excludable
dividend amount (EDA). This reflects the amount of corporate income subject to
tax minus any taxes paid by the corporation on the income and is the amount of
dividends that the corporation can distribute tax-free to its shareholders. For
example, suppose that a corporation has $1,000 of taxable income on which it
pays $350 of federal income tax. The corporation's EDA would be $650 and that
is the amount of dividends that the corporation could distribute tax-free to its
shareholders."
As a mechanical matter, EDA is the amount of income that the corporation
would have had after-tax if it had paid tax on its income at a 35% rate. The
corporation's EDA is based on the federal income tax shown on the corporation's
federal income tax return filed in the immediately prior calendar year.45 Thus, in
the example above, if the corporation pays a tax of $350, the EDA of $650 is
computed based on the assumption that the corporation had paid a 35% tax on a
pre-tax income of $1,000. The corporation's EDA here would be $650 and that is
the amount of dividend that could be excluded at the shareholder level, regardless
of what the corporation's actual pre-tax income was and at what rate it paid tax
42. The background to this proposal makes it seem that the proposal was developed largely at the White
House, with technical development of the proposal at the Treasury Department's Tax Policy Office coming
after the fact.
43. See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF BUSH PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 12. For detailed analyses of this
proposal, see Lorence L. Bravenec & Fred Feucht, The Bush Administration's Proposed Dividends Exclusion,
98 TAX NOTES 1251 (2003); Merle Erickson & James Smith, The President's Proposed Dividend Exemption
and Closely Held Companies, 98 TAX NOTES 1244 (2003); Calvin Johnson, The Bush 35 Percent Flat Tax on
Distributions from Public Corporations, 98 TAX NOTES 1881 (2003); Michael L. Schler, The Administration's
Dividend Exclusion Proposal, 98 TAX NOTES 1895 (2003). For a critique of the dividend exclusion proposal on
economics grounds, see Friedman & Greenstein, supra note 39. For a critique of the dividend exclusion
proposal on equity grounds, see Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., President's Dividends Plan Undertaxes High-Income
Taxpayers, 98 TAX NOTES 389 (2003). For an analysis of the practical implications of the President's proposal,
see Burgess J. W. Raby & William L. Raby, Tax Practitioners and the Dividend Exclusion, 98 TAX NOTES 553
(2003). For a proposal for an incremental investment credit as a substitute for the President's dividend exclusion
proposal, see Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., An Alternative to the Flawed Bush Dividend Plan, Financed by ETI
Repeal, 99 TAX NOTES 117 (2003).
44. See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF BUSH PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 12.
45. Id. at 14. For example, if a corporation uses the calendar year, its return for calendar year 1 would be
filed on March 15 of year 2, and the tax shown on that return would affect the corporation's EDA for year 3. Id.
These timing differences in the calculation of EDA would create tax-planning opportunities, some of which are
discussed later in this article.
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on that income. 6 Notice, therefore, that this proposal would exclude a dividend at
the shareholder level in full only to the extent that the corporation has paid a 35%
tax at the corporate level. To illustrate: if the corporation's pre-tax income was
$2,333 and was taxed at the lowest corporate rate bracket of 15% (thus resulting
in a corporate tax of $350), the corporation's EDA would still be only $650. If it
paid a dividend of $1,983 (its after-tax income), only $650 of it would be
excluded at the shareholder level and the remaining $1,333 would be taxable at
the shareholder level (at the shareholder's marginal tax rate).
If a corporation's distributions during the year exceed its EDA, the EDA
would be allocated to all distributions during the year pro rata and part of each
distribution would be excludable and part would be taxable. Under this proposal,
therefore, a shareholder would likely not know the actual tax consequences of the
dividend at the time it is received because the shareholder cannot know how
much of the EDA would be allocated to that dividend. This fact would make
preferred stock an unattractive equity holding for taxable shareholders because
they would not be able to calculate their likely after-tax return on the stock.47
This proposal would retain the capital gains tax on a shareholder's gain from
the sale of the stock and the preferential rate of tax on a shareholder's capital
gains (currently 15% for high-bracket shareholders and 5% for lower-bracket
shareholders). 4' However, the Bush Administration was concerned that this
aspect of the proposal would create an incentive for the corporation to distribute
dividends to its shareholders (who would not be taxed under the proposal) instead
of retaining the earnings at the corporate level (which would result in a capital
gain tax to the shareholder upon a sale of the stock at a gain). Accordingly, the
proposal would allow shareholders to increase their basis in the shares of stock in
the corporation to reflect retained earnings taxed at the corporate level. The
proposal accomplishes this by allowing the corporation to elect a dividend
reinvestment plan (DRIP) and allocate all or some portion of its EDA to these
basis increases. 49 This DRIP is elected at the corporate level without any
involvement by the corporation's shareholders. With respect to EDA allocated to
the DRIP, the corporation treats its income as if it had been distributed to its
shareholders (tax-free as would other dividends attributable to EDA), who then
contribute the income back to the corporation as a contribution to capital and,
thus, increase the bases of their stock. These allocated basis increases reflecting
the corporation's retained earnings are referred to as REBAs (namely, retained
earnings basis adjustments). These basis increases will reduce the amount of the
shareholder's gain from the sale of the stock to the extent that the sales price for
the stock reflects retained earnings that were previously taxed at the corporate
46. See Johnson, supra note 43, at 1888 (noting that, under this proposal, the EDA is always 65/30 or 186
percent of the tax actually paid at the corporate level).
47. See Schler, supra note 43, at 1900.
48. See I.R.C. § l(h) (amended 2003).
49. See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF BUSH PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 14; Johnson, supra note 43, at 1884.
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level. These basis increases reduce the corporation's EDA and its earnings and
profits. The proposal requires a corporation to keep records of the total REBAs
made with respect to its stock in prior years and refers to the cumulative amount
of REBAs for all years as the corporation's CREBA. The proposal requires that
the basis increases be allocated in the same manner as would a distribution and
does not allow the corporation to allocate basis increases to preferred stock.50
Suppose that a corporation's EDA is less than the distributions that it wants
to make during a year. The proposal treats the distribution as essential reversing
the basis adjustments made in the prior years. To that extent, the distribution is
nontaxable and reduces the shareholder's adjusted basis in the stock and reduces
the corporation's CREBA.' This gives the corporation a great deal of flexibility
in how it allocates its EDA and how it treats its distributions for tax purposes.
Unfortunately, that flexibility also provides tax planners with ample opportunities
for tax minimization schemes based on the dividend exemption proposal. The
ordering rules for the treatment of distributions under this proposal are as
follows:
(1) Distributions treated as dividends are excludable to the extent of
the corporation's EDA. (Excludable dividends reduce both the
corporation's EDA and earnings and profits.)
(2) To the extent that the distribution exceeds EDA, it is treated first as
a return of basis and then as capital gain to the extent of the
corporation's CREBA.
(3) Any excess of the distribution is treated as a taxable dividend to
the extent of the corporation's earnings and profits.
(4) To the extent that the excess of the distribution exceeds the
corporation's earnings and profits, it is treated as a nontaxable
return of capital to the extent of the shareholder's basis in the stock
and then as capital gain. 2
The proposal would retain the current Code's rules for determining whether a
redemption is treated as a sale or exchange of stock or a distribution. If a redemption
is treated as a sale or exchange of stock, it would reduce pro rata the redeeming
corporation's EDA and CREBA. For example, if a corporation redeems 5% of its
stock in a redemption that is treated as a sale or exchange, the corporation would
reduce its EDA for the year of the redemption and its CREBA by 5%.
53
50. See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF BUSH PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 14-15, 22.
51. If this nontaxable portion of the distribution due to reversal of the prior basis adjustments exceeds
the shareholder's basis in the stock, the excess is treated as capital gain from the sale of the shareholder's stock.
52. See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF BUSH PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 15.
53. See id.
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If a U.S. corporation receives an excludable dividend from another corporation,
it would not be taxable but would increase the recipient corporation's EDA.54 Thus,
it would remain excludable when the recipient corporation, in turn, distributes the
amount to its shareholders. The proposal would retain the 100% deduction for
dividends received by a corporation from another corporation of which it owns
80% or more of the stock. The 70% and 80% dividends received deductions of
current law would be retained only for distributions of pre-2001 earnings and
profits distributed before January 1, 2006, with respect to stock issued before
February 3, 2003."
How would I evaluate this dividend exemption proposal from a tax policy
point of view? Let me start this analysis by stating my belief that corporate
integration is a worthy goal of tax reform and simplification efforts. The current
system of double taxation of corporate earnings is difficult to defend on theoretical
56grounds. This is true regardless of whether the tax base used is income,
consumption, or some hybrid approach. The current system of double taxation of
corporate earnings has a number of negative economic effects, which would be
eliminated or at least ameliorated by corporate integration. First, double taxation
distorts choice-of-entity decisions, encouraging taxpayers to choose the noncorporate
form over the corporate form in order to avoid the double taxation of earnings, thus
resulting in a deadweight loss.57 Eliminating or significantly reducing the double
taxation of corporate earnings will allow taxpayers to choose the entity for their
business ventures based on nontax business and legal considerations, rather than tax
considerations. It will eliminate or reduce the deadweight loss that comes from tax
planning maneuvers designed to utilize the corporate form for the business activity
but avoid the double taxation of corporate earnings.
The Bush Administration's dividend exemption proposal, however, would
not completely eliminate the tax incentive to use a pass-through entity rather than
54. See id. at 20.
55. Seeid.
56. For an interesting article defending the double taxation of corporate earnings, see Jeffrey L. Kwall,
The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 68 N.C. L. REV. 613 (1990) (taking the
position that the classical system for taxing corporate earnings is necessary as a backstop to the progressive
distribution of the federal income tax). For an article that defends the double taxation of business earnings based
on the "benefit" fairness norm, see Herwig J. Schlunk, Double Taxation: The Unappreciated Ideal, 102 TAX
NOTES 893 (2004). In another article, two commentators argue that the double tax on corporate earnings may
provide a mechanism for minimizing a firm's agency costs. Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency
Costs, and the Price of Incorporation, 77 VA. L. REV. 277 (1991).
57. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE
PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET PROPOSAL 28 (Mar. 2003) [hereinafter JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N
DESCRIPTION]. There is disagreement regarding the extent of this deadweight loss, given that publicly traded
corporations must use the corporate form, regardless of whether double taxation exists, in order to have access
to the public equity markets and the concomitant liquidity. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Back to the 1930s?: The
Shaky Case for Exempting Dividends, 97 TAX NOTES 1599, 1601 (2002); see also AUSTAN GOOLSBEE, THE
IMPACT AND INEFFICIENCY OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX: EVIDENCE FROM STATE ORGANIZATIONAL FORM
DATA, NBER WORKING PAPER No. 9141 (Sept. 2002).
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the corporate form . 8 If a pass-through entity is used to conduct a business
venture, the income of the venture will be taxed once at the investor level and at
the investor's marginal tax rate. By contrast, under the Bush Administration's
dividend exemption proposal, if the corporate form is used to conduct the
venture, the income would be taxed once at the corporate level at a 35% rate, or,
if the corporation pays less than a 35%, only part of the income would be
protected from taxation at the shareholder level when it is distributed (because
EDA would be less than the amount of the pre-tax income minus the corporate
tax actually paid) and the income would bear at least a partial second,
shareholder-level tax. The total of the corporate-level and shareholder-level taxes
on this income could exceed a single tax on all of the income at a lower-bracket
investor's marginal tax rate. Thus, this dividend exemption proposal would have
the effect of reducing the benefits of the lower corporate rate brackets for
distributed (but not retained earnings) and retaining a bias against the corporate
form for lower-bracket investors. 9
Second, double taxation of corporate earnings also encourages a corporation
to use debt financing, rather than equity financing, to fund its operations and
acquisitions, because interest payments are deductible while dividend payments
are not.6° This leads to corporate capital structures that are heavily laden with
debt. Depending on the form of corporate integration chosen, ending the double
tax on corporate earnings will reduce or eliminate the tax bias in favor of debt
over equity financing. The maximum benefit in this regard would come from
corporate integration in the form of a dividend deduction at the corporate level
or, alternatively, a proposal under which neither dividends nor interest are
deductible by the corporation (but interest and dividends received from a
corporation are exempt from tax at the bondholder/shareholder level). 6' By
contrast, the Bush Administration's shareholder-level dividend exemption
proposal would reduce, but not really eliminate, this bias. Under the Bush
proposal, dividends would still not be deductible at the corporate level, whereas
corporate interest payments would continue to be deductible. Corporations would
still be encouraged to fund their operations and acquisitions through debt
financing rather than equity financing although the tax bias in favor of debt
financing would be reduced.62
58. The model of corporate integration that probably would be most effective in equalizing the tax treatment of
different forms of business enterprise is the Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBI model discussed in the
Treasury Department's comprehensive integration study released in early 1992. See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAXING
BUSINESS INCOME ONCE, supra note 35, at 39-58.
59. See Johnson, supra note 43, at 1882-83.
60. See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF BUSH PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 11.
61. The latter was the approach taken in the CBIT model in the Treasury Department's 1992 study of corporate
integration, which would accomplish a more complete equalization of debt and equity financing by corporations. See
U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAXING BuSINESS INCOME ONCE, supra note 35, at 39-58.
62. In addition, the bias in favor of debt over equity is one that pervades our tax system and any serious tax
reform proposal needs to do something about this bias throughout the system, not just in the corporate arena. See Avi-
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Third, the current double taxation system encourages retention of earnings at
the corporate level instead of distribution of earnings to the shareholders, i.e.,
provides a tax incentive for corporations not to make dividend distributions to its
shareholders. 6 In many cases, this earnings retention enables the corporation to
fund expansion of its existing business or the acquisition of valuable new
business opportunities that will contribute to the long-term growth of the
corporation's earnings. In other cases, however, as recent corporate scandals
have shown, this factor leads to the hoarding of cash by the corporation and use
of that cash to make acquisitions or undertake growth strategies to boost stock
price, some of which would not have taken place but for the fact that a second,
shareholder-level tax encourages retention of corporate earnings. Stated differently,
if the corporation uses the earnings to pay dividend distributions, two taxes may
result, both of which are imposed currently. If the corporation instead uses the
earnings to fund growth in the stock price, the second tax is postponed until the
shareholder sells the stock and realizes the appreciation in the stock, and that
second tax is at the lower capital gains rate, rather than at ordinary income rates.
This tax bias in favor of retained earnings is reduced by several factors. A
large percentage of the stock of publicly traded corporations is held by tax-
exempt investors (such as charitable organizations), other corporations that
receive a dividends-received deduction, foreign shareholders (who may pay little
or no tax on dividends if they are residents of foreign countries that have income
tax treaties in effect with the United States) or in tax-sheltered accounts such as
annuities, individual retirement accounts, qualified pension plans, and 401(k)
plans.64 These shareholders bear little or no tax on the dividend and no tax bias in
favor of retained earnings exists for them. In addition, corporations can reduce
the shareholder-level tax by making the distribution in the form of a redemption
taxable at the lower capital gains rates,65 instead of a dividend. Moreover, to the
extent that the dividend tax is capitalized into the price of stock, the bias in favor
of retaining earnings at the corporate level should apply only to new equity and
such new equity often does not pay dividends for nontax reasons.66 Finally, and
most importantly, the 2003 Act has substantially reduced the tax disincentive for
a corporation to make dividend distributions by lowering the tax rate on qualified
dividend income to 15% (or 5% in the case of lower-bracket taxpayers).
Corporate integration removes or reduces the tax incentive for corporations
to retain earnings at the corporate level. Proponents argue that corporations will
Yonah, supra note 57, at 1601; Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107
HARV. L. REV. 460 (1993).
63. See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF BUSH PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 12.
64. See, e.g., Jonathan Clements, Bush Is Wrong: The Dividend Tax Break Should Go to Companies, Not
Investors, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2003, at DI (stating that "as of the end of 2001, 64% of households' stock-fund
assets were held in variable annuities, individual retirement accounts and other tax-sheltered accounts");
William G. Gale, About Half of Dividend Payments Do Not Face Double Taxation, 97 TAX NOTES 839 (2002).
65. See I.R.C. §§ 302, 1(h).
66. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 57, at 1601.
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therefore be less likely to accumulate cash hoards for use in funding inefficient
acquisitions or ill-advised attempts at growth. Instead, elimination or reduction of
the double tax on corporation earnings will encourage corporations to distribute
the money to shareholders who will make more efficient use of the funds at the
shareholder level than the corporate managers would at the corporate level, or so
the proponents say. However, it is not at all clear that shareholders would do a
better job of reinvesting corporate earnings than do the managers of the
corporation, who have more expertise and better information concerning alternative
investments than do most shareholders. 67 In addition, because corporate dividends
may provide the shareholders with readily available cash, some shareholders will
spend the money, thus reducing net savings from investments in the corporate
form.68 In any event, consistent with the Administration's schizophrenic attitude
toward retained corporate earnings and reflecting its concern that the dividend
exemption proposal would put too much pressure on corporations to pay
dividends, the Bush Administration's dividend exemption plan would not fully
remove the incentive to retain earnings at the corporate level. A corporation
would be able to adopt a DRIP and allocate its EDA to shareholder basis
adjustments, thus providing its shareholders with a reduced capital gains tax on
sale without having to pay any dividends.
It is true that the fact that shareholders would no longer pay tax on dividends
under this proposal would cause some of those shareholders to pressure the
corporation to pay larger dividends. Some corporations would pay dividends in
response to this demand on the theory that investors will reward such behavior by•69
buying the stock and causing its price to increase. However, for the many
shareholders of publicly traded corporations who are already effectively tax
exempt with respect to their dividend income (e.g., charities and pension funds),
shareholder-level dividend tax relief makes no difference and they are not likely
to put immediate pressure on corporations to pay more dividends since they pay
no tax on dividends under current law.
Finally, double taxation of corporate earnings encourages the distribution of
earnings through complicated transactions such as share repurchases treated as
capital-gain redemptions rather than less complicated dividend distributions.7°
67. See R. Glenn Hubbard, Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 193,
195 (1998); Johnson, supra note 43, at 1885-86.
68. See Johnson, supra note 43, at 1885.
69. By putting pressure on corporations to pay dividends, however, it will reduce the available cash held
by corporations. With less cash on hand, corporations will be forced to do more borrowing or sell more stock to
obtain financing for capital spending or acquisitions. That, in turn, may mean reduced capital spending for new
projects and reduced merger activity because corporations will be hesitant to go into the capital markets to
obtain funding for the project or merger. See Ken Brown, Dividend Proposal Won't Quickly Solve Market's
Problems, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2003, at Cl. Of course, proponents would argue that this is an attribute of the
plan-placing a check on inefficient capital spending and mergers and acquisitions by forcing the corporation to
go into the capital markets to obtain funding for the project.
70. See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF BUSH PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 12.
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Corporate integration will reduce or eliminate this distortion. However, as
discussed below, the Bush Administration's dividend exemption proposal would
spawn its own series of complicated tax planning maneuvers. It is clear that the
White House proponents of this proposal did not understand or care to
understand the culture of tax avoidance that pervades the financial affairs of
many high-income individuals and corporations.
In evaluating the Bush Administration's dividend exemption proposal, one must
keep in mind that although the proposal might well enhance the economic efficiency
of the tax system, it has the potential to add tremendous complexity to the tax system.
It would require millions of stockholders of publicly traded corporations to keep
track of numerous basis increases and decreases on account of the allocation of EDA
by DRIPs to stock basis and the later reversal of those allocations on Form 1099s that
they will receive from the corporations in which they own stock. 7' Anti-abuse
provisions to deal with shareholders who hold stock only for short periods of time
would require many shareholders to keep track of their holding periods.72 The
corporations would have increased record keeping and administrative costs relating
to this dividend exemption proposal, in addition to continuing to incur the costs of
maintaining the earnings and profits account at the corporate level (which would still
play an important role in the taxation of a corporation's shareholders on distributions
under this proposal).73 Almost all of the corporate tax provisions in the current Code
would be retained, although the ultimate tax consequences under the rules would
differ from current law. On the other hand, the repeal of the accumulated earnings tax
and personal holding company tax under this proposal would reduce complexity at
the corporate level. 4
The Bush Administration's proposed system for taxing corporations also would
be subject to numerous tax planning abuses, a few of which I will highlight here.
High-bracket individual taxpayers could shift business or investment income to a
corporation to get the benefit of the 15% corporate tax bracket. 75 The after-tax
income could be distributed in part to the shareholder as a tax-free dividend to the
extent of the corporation's EDA and the remainder could be retained in corporate
form (with the shareholder-level tax deferred indefinitely) or distributed in
liquidation at the lower capital gains rates. Thus, under this proposal, the corporation
would be used as an incorporated pocketbook with no worry about the accumulated
earnings tax and personal holding company tax because those provisions would be
repealed.
Similarly, a taxpayer could use a corporation to reduce FICA and employment
taxes by shifting business income to the corporation and receiving only a very
71. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N DESCRIPTION, supra note 57, at 33.
72. See Schler, supra note 43, at 1896. The anti-abuse rules that would apply are in sections 246(c) and
1059(g), as modified by this dividend exemption proposal.
73. See, e.g., id. at 1897; JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N DESCRIPTION, supra note 57, at 32.
74. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N DESCRIPTION, supra note 57, at 33.
75. See Schler, supra note 43, at 1897.
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low salary. The corporation would owe income tax but no FICA or employment
tax on the income (except with respect to the shareholder's salary) and the
shareholder would owe FICA only on the salary.76 This device has the potential to
undermine the employment taxes of current law and would require anti-abuse
rules for dealing with under-compensated shareholder-employees. With no
double tax on corporate earnings, there would be little downside to a shareholder
using a corporation in this way. The 2003 Act's treatment of qualified dividend
income as taxable to individual shareholders at the preferential capital gains tax
rates creates this same potential tax planning abuse.
Numerous opportunities would exist for artificial losses and tax arbitrage.
For example, an individual could purchase stock of a corporation with a large
EDA balance shortly before the dividend record date at a price that reflects the
declared but unpaid dividend, receive the dividend tax-free, and then sell the
stock at an artificial capital loss (at the price reflecting the corporation's value
post-dividend) after meeting the holding period requirements of Section 246(c).
7
1
This would encourage tax-exempt shareholders of corporate stock to sell their
stock to taxable shareholders before a dividend record date and buy the stock
back after the dividend payment from another shareholder.7 ' There is nothing to
prevent tax-exempt investors from facilitating dividend arbitrage by taxable
shareholders.
Another planning technique would involve attempts to "stream" tax-exempt
dividends to taxable shareholders and sale or exchange redemptions to tax-
exempt shareholders. Such streaming techniques would be made more difficult to
the extent that the proposal requires redemptions to reduce current year EDA on
a pro rata basis, but this rule certainly does not prevent all streaming of
dividends. For example, suppose that a corporation has earnings in year 1 for
which corporate tax will not be shown on a return until year 2 and, therefore,
EDA will not be created until year 3. The corporation could redeem the tax-
exempt shareholders' stock in year 2 (at a price that reflects the corporation's
earnings in year 1) and since no EDA has yet been created, none will be allocated
to the redemption. The corporation then distributes the earnings in year 3 to the
taxable shareholders as tax-free dividends to the extent of the EDA.79
These and other planning techniques illustrate the need to carefully think
through any integration proposal before (not after) it is enacted into law. In its
haste to try to ram this proposal through the Congress, the Administration simply
did not give sufficient thought to the potential problems with it. It never
adequately explained why this proposal should have been given priority in the
legislative process. Congress wisely decided to study the proposal more carefully




79. See id. at 1898.
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integration issue for further study, Congress enacted a "rough justice" partial
integration alternative of reducing (but not eliminating) the double tax on
corporate earnings distributed to noncorporate shareholders in Section 1(h)( 11),
with little or no study. This provision merely reduces the dividend-level tax
without eliminating any of the existing corporate tax provisions. In addition, this
provision is only temporary in nature and is set to sunset for taxable years of
shareholders starting after 2008.
In an attempt to sell its dividend exemption proposal to a skeptical Congress
and taxpaying public, the Bush Administration made some erroneous or
overstated arguments in support of the proposal. For example, the Administration
advanced this dividend relief proposal in part as a proposal to jump-start the
flagging economy.80 However, corporate integration should not be presented as a
short-term economic stimulus proposal because it will not provide much of a
short-term stimulus.8' Its effects on economic growth are long-term in nature. 2
Nor should it be sold as a way to boost stock prices because it is not at all clear to
what extent corporate integration actually increases stock prices over the long
runs3 and it is questionable whether boosting stock prices (as opposed to
stimulating long-term economic growth) is an appropriate focus of government
policy making. Instead, corporate integration should be undertaken because it will
80. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 5, at G-I (Pamela Olson, then Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax
Policy, argued at a conference sponsored by the Federal Bar Association that the Bush Administration's
dividend relief proposal was needed to "get the economy back on its feet and growing again").
81. See Jane G. Gravelle, Effects of Dividend Relief on Economic Growth, the Stock Market, and
Corporate Tax Preferences, 56 NAT'L TAX J. 653, 659-60 (2003) [hereinafter Gravelle, Effects of Dividend
Reliefl. As pointed out by one leading commentator, most taxable dividends are paid to high-income individuals
who are more likely to save rather than spend the tax savings from the dividend tax relief. Avi-Yonah, supra
note 57. Such saving obviously helps the economy in the long run but does not provide a short-term stimulus.
See also Gregg A. Esenwein & Jane G. Gravelle, The Taxation of Dividend Income: An Overview and Economic
Analysis of the Issues, TAX NOTES TODAY, 198-16, Oct. 7, 2002 ("Using dividend tax reductions to stimulate the
economy is unlikely to be very effective because, unlike direct government spending or tax cuts for lower and
moderate income individuals, it is not as likely to directly increase spending, which is the most effective way to
stimulate the economy.").
82. In addition, recent studies of the tax cuts enacted in the first year of the Bush Administration
demonstrate that it is difficult to use tax cuts to stimulate the economy. See, e.g., MATTHEW D. SHAPIRO & JOEL
SLEMROD, DID THE 2001 TAX REBATE STIMULATE SPENDING? EVIDENCE FROM TAXPAYER SURVEYS, NBER
WORKING PAPER No. 9308 (Nov. 2002); see also Congressional Budget Office, Economic Stimulus: Evaluating
Proposed Changes in Tax Policy, TAX NOTES TODAY, 5-11, Jan. 8, 2002.
83. There is widespread disagreement concerning the effect of corporate integration, particularly the
dividend exemption form of corporate integration proposed by the Bush Administration, on appreciation in the
price of stocks. Some estimate that it will little or no effect, others estimate about a 5% increase in stock prices,
and proponents of the Bush plan argue that a 10% increase in stock prices will occur. See, e.g., Brett Ferguson,
Treasury Renews Push for Higher Debt Limit, Warns Ceiling Could Be Hit in Late February, BNA DAILY TAX
REP., Dec. 27, 2002; Esenwein & Gravelle, supra note 81; Gravelle, Effects of Dividend Relief, supra note 81,
at 660-63. If the dividend relief proposal were successful in increasing existing stock prices by a significant
amount, one could argue that the result would be an unfair windfall for current stockholders who paid a
discounted price for the stock based on the assumption that future dividends would be taxable. See Avi-Yonah,
supra note 57, at 1599.
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remove distortions concerning economic behavior caused by the double taxation of
corporate earnings and help promote long-term growth in the economy.
Another overstated argument made by the Bush Administration is that this
dividend relief plan would substantially reduce incentives for corporations to inflate
their earnings through accounting gimmicks that produce earnings unmatched by
cash. It is argued that corporate integration would make dividends a more
attractive way for corporations to attract investors. Since dividends are paid in
cash, the corporation must actually have cash on hand to pay them. Accounting
gimmicks can make earnings look greater than they are and thereby inflate stock
prices artificially, at least for a temporary period of time, but it is hard to fake the
cash necessary to pay dividends. Thus, a greater focus on dividends by investors
will make corporate accounting more honest, or so the argument goes. 5 This
argument certainly has some merit to it. As noted above, however, the ability of
corporations to use DRIPs instead of dividends greatly reduces the pressure to
pay dividends and, hence, the focus of shareholders on dividends. Moreover, for
the Enron-type corporate hustler, a rapid stock price rise from inflated earnings is
worth more than the slower, steadier rise in stock price on account of dividend
payout policy.
The Bush Administration also overstated its argument that the dividend
exemption proposal would be a significant factor in stopping corporate tax
evasion and reducing the incentive for a corporation to engage in costly and
questionable tax-minimization schemes.86 The theory is that the corporation will
have an incentive to properly report and pay tax on its income because only
corporate earnings tat have been taxed would result in tax-free distributions or a
basis adjustment for the corporation's shareholders that would reduce the amount
of gain subject to tax as a capital gain upon sale of the stock. This proposal
undoubtedly would have some positive effects in reducing the benefits of
corporate tax minimization17 but probably would not alone do much to solve the
corporate tax shelter problem. A shareholder basis adjustment that may reduce
some future capital gains tax by the shareholder pales in comparison to the
corporation not paying a 35% tax on the income in the first place.88 Moreover,
under the Bush Administration's proposal, distributions in excess of EDA, prior
DRIP reversals, and corporate-level earnings and profits, would be tax-free to the
extent that they reduce a shareholder's basis in her stock and the excess would
receive sale or exchange treatment and be taxable at the lower capital gain rates.
This means that tax preferences and corporate tax shelters that succeed in
84. Cf GENERAL EXPLANATION OF BUSH PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 11-12.
85. See, e.g., George Melloan, If Democrats Want Corporate Reform, Here's How to Do It, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 21, 2003, at A19.
86. See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF BUSH PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 11-12.
87. See, e.g., Robert Carroll, Kevin A. Hassett, & James B. Mackie Il, The Effect of Dividend Tax Relief
on Investment Incentives, 56 NAT'L TAX J. 629, 647 (2003).
88. See Johnson, supra note 43, at 1891; see also Gale & Orszag, supra note 39, at 418.
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reducing a corporation's earnings and profits would still provide a benefit for the
corporation's shareholders in the form of a tax-exempt basis recovery and gain
taxable at capital gains rates (as opposed to tax on the income at the corporate
level at ordinary income rates).8 9
Instead, this dividend exemption proposal would do more to advance the cause
of tax reform if the Bush Administration adds proposals to seriously crack down on
corporate tax preferences and tax shelters and reduce the gap between the income
reported to shareholders and the income reported for federal income tax purposes,
including taxing all foreign-source income earned by corporations (whether
directly or through foreign subsidiaries).90 This would improve the perceived
fairness of the plan to low- and middle-income taxpayers and, more importantly,
would provide revenue to help pay for the dividend exemption proposal. The net
result would be a fairer tax system as well as one with fewer distortive effects on
economic behavior.
The point of this discussion is certainly not that I oppose corporate
integration or even that I oppose the dividend exemption proposal of the Bush
Administration. In fact, I strongly favor corporate integration as a serious tax
reform agenda item and I think that the Bush Administration proposal is certainly
one logical alternative for achieving integration. Instead, I merely intend to make
the case for more careful study of the alternatives. There are serious pros and
cons to each alternative and which method of integration makes the most sense
may depend on decisions made concerning other reforms of the tax system.
Corporate integration should not be enacted in a vacuum. Corporate integration
should be accomplished as part of a major overall tax reform effort, which
attempts to remedy corporate tax sheltering and achieve proper taxation of
international income earned by corporations. It should not be done in isolation as
part of the annual budget reconciliation process.
III. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S STEALTH (?) MOVE TO A
POORLY DESIGNED CONSUMPTION TAX BASE: CONSUMPTION TAX "LITE"
There are pros and cons to adopting a consumption tax system (whether in
replacement of, or as a supplement to, the income tax), including issues relating
to tax fairness, economic efficiency, and complexity. 9' For example, there is
89. See Johnson, supra note 43, at 1890.
90. See, e.g., Alan Murray, Dividend-Tax Plan Needs Fine-Tuning to Mollify Senators, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 14, 2003, at A4.
91. For thoughtful discussions of the pros and cons of moving to a consumption base, including the
adoption of a value-added tax, see generally William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal
Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974); Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax,
92 HARv. L. REV. 1575 (1979); EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT: HOW TO MAKE THE TAX SYSTEM
BETrER AND SIMPLER (2002); Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70
TEX. L. REV. 1145 (1992); Edward J. McCaffery, The Missing Links in Tax Reform, 2 CHAPMAN L. REV. 233,
248-51 (1999); John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type Income Tax Proposals in the
United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2095 (2000); Alan
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widespread disagreement about the magnitude of increase in savings and
investment on account of adoption of a consumption tax system in the United
States.92 There is also disagreement about the extent of the transition problems in
moving to a consumption tax--certainly, some commentators have concluded
that transition issues make adoption of a consumption tax in replacement of the
income tax very unlikely.93 Moreover, a significant concern about adoption of a
consumption-based tax system is the possible shift in the tax burden from high-
income taxpayers to low- and middle-income taxpayers because low and middle-
income taxpayers generally consume a much greater percentage of their incomes
than do high-income taxpayers. 9' Even a consumption tax system can be designed
to be progressive in the distribution of the tax burden although it may require
somewhat more steeply progressive rates to achieve such progressivity.
95 But
whatever one's views concerning the use of a consumption tax system as a primary
revenue source at the federal level, we should be able to agree that before adopting
such a tax system careful study and vigorous public debate should occur. This is
not something that should be buried in budget bills and masqueraded as a
simplification measure or a short-term fiscal stimulus measure.
In early 2003, the Bush Administration proposed several new tax-free savings
vehicles that appear to be moving the system in the direction of a cash-flow
consumption tax base.96 Although none of these proposals were enacted as part of
the 2003 Act, there are strong indications that the Bush Administration intends to
present these proposals again as part of 2004 proposed tax legislation.
97 Under one
of these proposals, the Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) of current law
would be replaced by Lifetime Savings Accounts (LSAs) that could be used for
Schenk, Value Added Tax: Does This Consumption Tax Have a Place in the Federal Tax System?, 7 VA. TAX
REv. 207 (1987); William J. Tumier, Designing an Efficient Value Added Tax, 39 TAX L. REV. 435 (1984);
Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV.
931 (1975) [hereinafter Warren, Fairness f]; Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than
an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980) [hereinafter Warren, Fairness II].
92. See, e.g., JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKUA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE GREAT
DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM 166-70 (2d ed. 2000); Eric M. Engen & William G. Gale, The Effects of
Fundamental Tax Reform on Saving, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 83, 99-102
(Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale eds., 1996); McNulty, supra note 91, at 2133-38.
93. See, e.g., Ronald A. Pearlman, Transition Issues in Moving to a Consumption Tax: A Tax Lawyer's
Perspective, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 393 (Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale
eds., 1996). But see Mitchell L. Engler & Michael S. Knoll, Simplifying the Transition to a (Progressive)
Consumption Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 53 (2003).
94. See, e.g., Warren, Fairness I, supra note 91; Warren, Fairness I!, supra, note 91.
95. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor
Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 947, 956 (1975).
96. For detailed consideration of these savings proposals, see Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale &
Peter R. Orszag, The Administration's Savings Proposals: Preliminary Analysis, 98 TAX NOTES 1423 (2003);
Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Does the Trickle-Down Theory for Pensions Hold Water?, 98 TAX
NOTES 1180 (2003) [hereinafter Sullivan, Trickle-Down Theory].
97. See Bob Davis & John D. McKinnon, Tax-Free Savings Get Renewed Push, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5,
2003, at Al.
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any type of savings and Retirement Savings Accounts (RSAs) that could be used
for retirement savings.
Under the proposal, an individual would be allowed to contribute up to
$7,500 of cash per year to an LSA, regardless of the amount of wage income that
he or she had.98 The LSAs would not be subject to income limits, so both Michael
Dell and the nanny for his children could contribute the same amounts to an
LSA. Contributions to an LSA would not be deductible but earnings in the LSA
would accumulate free of tax. All distributions from the LSA would be tax-free,
regardless of the individual's age or use of the distribution. These LSAs would
not be subject to minimum distribution rules during the owner's lifetime.99
The $7,500 contribution limit would apply to all accounts held in a particular
individual's name, regardless of who made the contribution. Thus, this proposal
would allow an individual to contribute up to $7,500 per year to an LSA for
another individual, provided that contributions to all LSAs held in a particular
individual's name could not exceed $7,500.'00
In addition, the proposal would allow an individual to contribute in cash to
an RSA the lesser of $7,500 or the individual's taxable compensation income.'"'
Unlike the IRA rules of current law, no income limits would apply to these
RSAs. As with contributions to an LSA, contributions to an RSA would not be
deductible, but the earnings on such contributions would accumulate tax-free and
qualified distributions from the plan would not be taxable. Qualified distributions
would be distributions made after the age of 58, regardless of the retirement
status of the individual, or on the individual's death or disability. Any other
distribution would be a nonqualified distribution and would be taxable to the
recipient to the extent that it exceeded the distributee's basis and would be
subject to an additional tax. These RSAs would not be subject to minimum
distribution rules during the account owner's lifetime.' 2
Existing Roth IRAs would become RSAs and be subject to the rules for
RSAs. The proposal also would allow taxpayers to convert balances in Archer
Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs), Coverdell Education Savings Accounts
(ESAs), Qualified State Tuition Plans (QSTPs), Roth IRAs, and traditional
deductible and nondeductible IRAs to LSA balances. Because contributions to
MSAs and traditional deductible IRAs are not taxed, conversions to RSAs would
be taxable, but a transition rule would allow the taxpayer to pay the resulting tax
on the conversion over a four-year period in the case of a conversion of a
deductible IRA to an RSA. Because contributions to ESAs, QSTPs, and
traditional nondeductible IRAs are made with after-tax dollars, the conversion of
98. GENERAL EXPLANATION OF BUSH PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 119-20. The LSA contribution
limit would be indexed for inflation. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 120.
101. Id. The RSA contribution limit would be indexed for inflation. Id.
102. Id.
300
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those accounts to RSAs apparently would not be included in income.'
3 Although
new contributions to traditional, nondeductible, and Roth IRAs would no longer
be permitted, new contributions to ESAs, QSTPs, and MSAs would continue to
be permitted, although contributions made after enactment of the RSA would not
be eligible for conversion.
The Bush Administration also proposed a consolidation of defined-contribution
accounts that permit employee deferrals or after-tax contributions, including 401(k),
SIMPLE 401(k), Thrift, section 457 plans, and SIMPLE IRAs and Salary Reduction
Simplified Employee Pensions ("SARSEP") into single Employer Retirement
Savings Accounts ("ERSA"). These accounts would generally follow the rules
applicable to 401(k) plans under current law, subject to certain simplifications.
Accordingly, under this proposal, employees could defer wages of up to $12,000 per
year (increasing to $15,000 by 2006). In the case of employees aged 50 and older, an
additional $2,000 of wages per year could be deferred (increasing to $5,000 per year
by 2006). The limit on contributions to ERSAs would be the lesser of 100 percent of
compensation or $40,000. The proposal would also simplify and modify the
nondiscrimination testing and minimum coverage 
rules.' 4
The Bush Administration justified these latter proposals as a simplification
measure and asserted that the current complicated qualified retirement plan rules
have led to a decline in participation in such plans.' °5 These proposals are similar
in many respects to those advanced by the Joint Committee Staff in 2001 as part
of its simplification project. Although I have some concern about the particulars
of some of the pension simplification proposals, I think that as a whole that they
would constitute an improvement to the current complex rules relating to
qualified retirement plans. However, I do think that careful study has to be made
of the potential impact of these changes on the availability of pension plan
coverage to low- and middle-income workers (sometimes called "rank-and-file"
employees).
I have more major concerns with the Administration's LSA and RSA
proposals. One major concern I have about these proposals is their effect of the
distribution of the income tax burden. The Bush Administration attempted to
maintain that these proposals would bring significant benefits to low- and
middle-income taxpayers in the form of tax-free compounding and elimination of
complex paperwork.' ° The Administration, however, neglected to mention that
these proposals would provide most of the benefits to high-income taxpayers,
who have more discretionary income to invest and for whom tax deferral means
more in dollar terms (since the tax deferred for such individuals is a larger
amount given their higher marginal tax rates). Most low- and middle-income
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 5, at G-1 (summarizing a speech at the Federal Bar Association by
then Assistant Treasury Secretary Pamela Olson).
106. See, e.g., id.
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taxpayers have not taken full advantage of the existing tax-favored savings
vehicles in the Code, so for those taxpayers, the accounts do not provide that
much of an additional incentive to save.' °7 Thus, the primary beneficiaries of
these new tax-favored savings vehicles are likely to be high-income taxpayers
who have contributed the maximum to the existing tax-favored savings vehicles
and have excess savings that they can shift to these new savings vehicles.' 8
In addition, these savings proposals increase tax complexity in some respects and
decrease tax complexity in other respects. For example, these proposals increase
complexity to the extent that taxpayers open new LSA and RSA accounts but do not
consolidate existing tax-preferred savings into such accounts.' °9 By providing an
increased opportunity for taxpayers to contribute to Roth-type savings vehicles, in
terms of eligibility and dollar limits, these proposals will also increase tax complexity
because more taxpayers will have to choose how to balance their savings between
deductible and nondeductible savings. "o
On the other hand, these proposals decrease tax complexity to the extent that
they encourage taxpayers to consolidate existing tax-favored savings vehicles
into the new savings vehicles."' These proposals also decrease tax complexity by
making contributions to these LSAs and RSAs nondeductible and not placing any
restrictions on withdrawals from LSAs. 112
Another major concern with the LSA and RSA proposals is that they would
undermine the retirement security program of current law. In particular, the
concern is that if the owners of a small business can set aside $15,000 of savings
tax free with no requirement that they include any employees in the savings
program, they will have less of an incentive to set up retirement plans which
include coverage for employees. ' 3 In addition, employers could selectively make
contributions to LSAs for highly compensated employees only, thus undermining
the longstanding policy of the pension laws of promoting retirement savings for
rank-and-file employees. 14
Another serious concern with the LSA proposal is that it does not place any
limitation on the beneficiary's use of the funds in the account, even though it is
intended that these accounts be set up in part for retirement purposes. Without such
107. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N DESCRIPTION, supra note 57, at 217.
108. See id. However, proponents of the Bush Administration's savings proposals would argue that by
removing income limits for both LSAs and RSAs and by not limiting withdrawals from LSAs, more taxpayers
will be eligible to contribute and so banks and other sponsors of these vehicles will have an incentive to
extensively market these vehicles. Thus, they argue that more taxpayers of all income levels are likely to know
about these vehicles and that fact will lead to increased participation in these vehicles by taxpayers at all income
levels. See id. at 217 n.356.




113. See id at 218.
114. See id.
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a limitation, many taxpayers, particularly low- and middle-income taxpayers, will
spend the money instead of saving it for retirement, thus leaving them with far less
retirement savings than they need."5 If a taxpayer has limited resources to invest,
he is more likely to place his funds in an LSA and have free use of the funds, rather
than in a retirement account with restrictions. Thus, many taxpayers' contributions
to accounts set aside for retirement may decrease. Given the financial strain that the
baby boomers will place on the Social Security system, this is a particularly
inopportune time to undertake a new tax-favored savings program that may
undermine retirement savings.
Yet another concern is that because these proposed LSAs and RSAs do not
provide the participant with a current deduction, as do the traditional IRAs and
many other retirement savings vehicles of current law, taxpayers, particularly low
and middle-income taxpayers, might psychologically view such non-deductible
savings vehicles as less attractive." 6 It is, of course, difficult to measure the
magnitude of this psychological effect.
The Bush Administration's savings and retirement account proposals and its
decision to attempt to steer the tax system in the direction of a consumption base
are based on the idea that cutting taxes on savings and putting more of the tax
burden on consumers will stimulate savings and long-term growth. However, the
extent to which these proposals will increase savings rates and long-term is
unclear' and, in any event, it is difficult to predict the macroeconomic effects of
tax policy changes.'
Moreover, even if one accepts the conclusion that a properly designed
consumption tax system will stimulate long-term growth, the Bush Administration's
stealth move toward a consumption tax is unlikely to generate the benefits of a true
consumption-based tax system because it lacks numerous features of a theoretically
consistent and properly designed consumption tax proposal. I will mention three of
those features here. First, the proposal allows existing savings as well as new
savings to qualify for these tax-favored savings accounts. Thus, many taxpayers
with savings are likely to merely shift their existing savings from taxable
accounts to tax-favored LSAs, thus resulting in no net increase in savings by such
taxpayers." 9 By allowing income on existing savings as well as new savings to
qualify for exemption under the proposal, it will not provide the long-term
growth potential of a properly designed consumption tax system.1
2 In fact, by
cutting revenue and adding to the budget deficit while allowing old as well as
115. See, e.g., id.; Aaron Lucchetti, Bush Retirement Proposals Alter Landscape, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7,
2003, at C1.
116. See Lucchetti, supra note 115.
117. See, e.g., Burman, Gale & Orszag, supra note 96, at 1438-39.
118. See, e.g., John W. Diamond & Pamela H. Moomau, Issues in Analyzing the Macroeconomic Effects
of Tax Policy, 56 NAT'L TAX J. 447 (2003).
119. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N DESCRIPTION, supra note 57, at 216-18.
120. See Burman, Gale & Orszag, supra note 96, at 1439 (stating that "a consumption tax would only
exempt the return to new capital investments, not to old capital").
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new savings to qualify, its impact on private savings may be negative or only
slightly positive during the first five to ten years and its effect on national saving
(private saving plus public saving) is almost certainly negative over the first ten
years of the proposal.'2' In addition, in terms of economic theory, although
increasing the return to savings by cutting taxes on savings has the effect of causing
some taxpayers to substitute investment for consumption (the "substitution effect"),
it has the effect of causing other taxpayers to save less and consume more because
less saving is necessary to achieve a targeted level of savings (the "income
effect").'
22
Second, nothing in the Bush proposals purports to do anything about the
distortions caused by the income tax system's treatment of borrowed funds. The
proposals do not include borrowed funds in income and, therefore, are unlikely to
do much to reduce borrowing for consumption, one of the appealing features of a
true consumption tax system. Thus, a taxpayer could use borrowed funds to pay
for consumption and yet not owe any tax on the consumption until the loan was
repaid. 24 This glaring omission in the Bush proposals allows a taxpayer to defer
tax beyond the time of consumption, a timing mismatch that is significant given
the time value of money.'25 Given the political realities of a debt-oriented society,
it is not surprising that the Bush Administration has not embraced this part of a
consumption-based tax system. However, a serious consumption tax proposal
should deal with this issue. In any event, a properly designed consumption tax
system should have consistent treatment of capital income and expense-if
income from capital is exempt from tax, interest expense should not be deductible.
Third, as a theoretical matter, whether we use an income tax system or a
consumption tax system, we should treat home ownership and a taxpayer's use of
other consumer durables as personal consumption activities. That means, for
example, that we should tax the imputed income (i.e., the fair rental value) from a
homeowner's use of housing that she owns, since such income represents
consumption for shelter. Similar treatment under either an income tax system or a
121. See id.
122. See JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N DESCRIPTION, supra note 57, at 216-17.
123. See, e.g., Greg Ip, Bush Floats Shift to Consumption Tax, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2003, at A3
(quoting Alan Auerbach, a leading tax economist at the University of California at Berkeley).
124. Under the income tax system, a taxpayer who borrows to pay for consumption defers payment of
tax on the consumption until he or she earns the income used to repay the principal on the loan (i.e., the
borrowed funds are not taxed at the time of the borrowing but the income used to repay the loan is taxed with no
offsetting deduction for repayment of the creditor). Thus, an income tax system distorts economic behavior by
encouraging borrowing for consumption. By contrast, a theoretically consistent consumption tax proposal
would include borrowed funds used for consumption in the tax base, but then allow the taxpayer to deduct the
repayment of the loan. Accordingly, a theoretically consistent consumption tax does a better job of aligning the
timing of the tax with the timing of the taxpayer's consumption in the case of funds borrowed for consumption
and thereby removes the tax incentive to borrow for consumption.
125. Cf Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Proposal for an "Unlimited Savings Allowance," TAX NOTES
TODAY, 171-46, Aug. 28, 1995 (discussing the failure of the USA Tax proposal to include borrowed funds used
for consumption in the tax base). This timing mismatch becomes even more important if tax rates change
between the date that the loan is taken out and the date that the loan is repaid.
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consumption tax system should apply to imputed income from the owner's use of
other consumer durables, such as a car, because, again, such amounts represent
consumption. Yet, we have never attempted to tax either item in our income tax
system and are not likely to do so in any consumption tax system. In fact, many
consumption tax proposals, including the Hall-Rabushka Flat Tax system, do not
even attempt to tax such items. The non-taxation of imputed income from owner-
occupied housing is one of the tax preferences accorded home ownership and has
widespread and strong political support, even though such non-taxation distorts
economic behavior'26 and causes the prices of homes to be higher than they would
be in the absence of the tax preference.22 Thus, for political reasons as well as
administrability concerns, the Bush Administration has chosen not to take on this
issue, despite the Administration's seeming interest in a consumption base.
Another very important tax subsidy for home ownership is the home mortgage
interest deduction. 28 Since such interest represents part of the cost of maintaining
one's shelter, it should not be deductible in either an income tax system or a
consumption tax system. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and subsequent legislation did
cut back on the deduction, limiting it to the interest on two homes and only for
acquisition indebtedness and a limited amount of home equity indebtedness. The Flat
Tax and other consumption tax proposals purport to disallow any deduction for home
mortgage interest expense. Yet, despite the theoretical inconsistency of allowing a
deduction for such a personal consumption item, the deduction remains and is
unlikely to be eliminated as part of a tax reform effort (whether we retain our hybrid
income base or shift to more of a consumption base). The best one can hope for
realistically is to further limit the deduction by allowing the interest to be deducted
on only the taxpayer's personal residence (not two residences, as is allowed under
current law) and to restrict the deduction to acquisition indebtedness or the
refinancing of acquisition indebtedness and eliminate the deduction for interest on
home equity indebtedness. There seems to be only a strained connection between
allowing the deduction for home equity interest and the policy underlying the home
mortgage deduction of fostering political stability by promoting home ownership. It
does not require a move toward a consumption base to achieve this reform. The Bush
Administration has done nothing to promote this reform, which would be consistent
with an attempt to promote savings and move toward a consumption-based tax
system.
126. By providing a tax preference for home ownership, the non-taxation of imputed income encourages
more people to own homes than if the tax system were neutral with respect to home ownership.
127. At least some of the tax benefits accorded home ownership are capitalized into the price of homes;
therefore, the purchaser of the home is paying a higher price for the home than she would if the tax system were
neutral with respect to home ownership.
128. The home mortgage interest deduction is intended to encourage home ownership and the political
stability that comes with such home ownership--it is a tax subsidy for home ownership. See S. REP. No. 99-
313, at 804 (1986). For a recent policy analysis of this tax subsidy, see Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little
House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARtZ. ST. L.J. 1350
(2000).
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Further subsidization by the tax system of home ownership and the ownership
of other consumer durables is provided by the current deductibility of state and
local real property taxes and personal property taxes. Such taxes arguably should
not be deductible in a theoretically pure income tax system or consumption tax
system. Yet, Congress decided in 1986 to retain this deduction (while at the same
time eliminating the deduction for state and local sales taxes). The Flat Tax and
other consumption tax proposals often include an attempt to eliminate this
deduction. However, the deduction has widespread support and the deduction
would likely survive any tax reform efforts (at least the portion relating to the
state and local real estate taxes). In any event, despite its apparent interest in
promoting a move to a consumption base, the Bush Administration has shown no
interest in taking on this issue.
At the end of the day, I believe that it may be both desirable and politically
feasible for Congress to enact some type of federal consumption tax (such as a
low-rate value added tax) as a supplement to, not in replacement of, the income
tax system. Congress could use the revenue from such a consumption tax to
reform and simplify the income tax system, repeal the alternative minimum tax
provisions, and repeal or substantially reduce the regressive payroll taxes.
Moreover, if Congress adopted a consumption tax as a supplement to, rather than
replacement for, the income tax, Congress and the Treasury Department could
study various aspects of this supplementary consumption tax, including how
much revenue it raises, the costs of implementing it for both taxpayers and the
government, its distributional effects, and its economic and social effects.
Congress could use the results of that study to gradually expand the role of the
consumption tax and concomitantly reduce the role of the income tax as a
revenue raiser if it determines that such a move is desirable (after considering tax
fairness as well as economic efficiency and administrability issues). 2
9
This is not the approach being taken by the Bush Administration. It is proposing
neither a theoretically consistent consumption tax system as a replacement for the
income tax system nor a value-added tax or other consumption tax as a supplement
to the income tax. Both of those approaches would produce a vigorous debate
concerning the positive and negative aspects of consumption taxes and would require
a lengthy and deliberative legislative process. Instead, the Bush Administration is
trying to avoid that debate by masking its piecemeal consumption tax proposal as
nothing more than a modest expansion of existing savings features of our hybrid
income tax system. In fact, however, if all of the Bush proposals were enacted into
law (including the tax-favored savings account proposals as well as the dividend
exemption proposal), a significant portion of the investment income realized by most
taxpayers would be exempt from the income tax, just as it would under a
129. See Robert J. Peroni, Back to the Future: A Path to Progressive Reform of the U.S. International
Income Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 975, 976 n.2 (1997). Although I disagree with some significant
elements of Professor Graetz's proposals to replace the current income tax, discussed earlier in this article, we
obviously also are in agreement on significant other aspects of how we should proceed with tax reform.
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consumption tax system. These proposals, therefore, are a significant step in the
direction of a consumption tax system and should be analyzed and debated by
members of Congress as such. If these proposals are enacted into law, one can
imagine that the Administration's next step in a couple of years (assuming that
President Bush is re-elected) would be to argue that it is unfair that high-income
taxpayers who have investment income in excess of the LSA and RSA limits have to
pay income tax on such income and, therefore, propose exempting all investment
income from the income tax. Once principle is ignored in drawing a line, it is indeed
difficult to hold the line. We should not abandon all taxation of income from capital
and our hybrid income-based tax system so cavalierly.
We have pressing needs for revenue to support the government's direct
expenditure programs, including large amounts of revenue for increased defense
expenditures, homeland security, Medicare and Medicaid reform, health care reform,
and Social Security reform. Any new tax system will need to raise as much, or
probably more, revenue as the current system and should do so at the same or
reduced administrative costs. The proponents of substituting a consumption-based
system for our current system bear the burden of demonstrating that this requirement
has been met.'3° Alternatively, if any proposed new tax system is projected to lose
revenue, then the proponents should come up with specific proposed cuts in
government spending to pay for it.'3 ' The fiscal health of our nation depends on it.
One last point bears mention here. The pace of federal tax legislation
increased dramatically in the 1980s and that pace seems to have continued
unabated throughout 1990s and the first three years of the 21st Century. Frequent
and extensive tax changes are a major contributing factor to the increasing
complexity of the federal income tax system and serve to undermine its stability.
We should keep in mind that this phenomenon is not likely to change with the
130. This requirement should be met without relying on an Enron-like revenue estimation process,
which attempts to mask huge revenue losses by assuming unrealistic and highly speculative increases in
investment and income as a result of a tax cut. Dynamic analysis (i.e., considering the macroeconomic effects of
tax policies) has its place in the legislative process, but using so-called "dynamic scoring" should not be used as
primary revenue estimation device because of the uncertainties inherent in attempting to predict changes in
behavior. Conservatism in revenue estimation is the safer course. For recent commentary on dynamic scoring,
see William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Making the Right Case for Dynamic Analysis, 99 TAX NoTES 417
(2003); Martin A. Sullivan, AEI Conference Examines the Future of Revenue Estimating, 101 TAX NorEs 683
(2003).
131. Many members of Congress of both political parties, including some of the most conservative
members of Congress, who rail against the tax system and government spending have far less enthusiasm for
actually reducing govemment spending. These congressional representatives continue to support budget bills,
such as the recently-passed 2003 omnibus spending bill, containing embarrassing budget items of $1 million for
the Iowa Historical Society for exhibits relating to the world food prize and $750,000 for the Please Touch
Museum in Philadelphia. The 2003 omnibus spending bill passed in February 2003 with only thirty-one
Republicans in the House voting against, causing conservative commentator Stephen Moore to comment:
"Congress has now sent to the president one of the ugliest spending bills in a decade-a $400 billion 'omnibus
spending bill' that busts the budget and sets Olympic records for the levels of pork barrel spending." Stephen
Moore, Congress Packs More Pork than Ever in Budget Bill, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, at A33.
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adoption of a new tax system such as a consumption tax system." 2 Congress
would likely tinker with it as much as it has tinkered with the current income tax
system, producing increased complexity and instability in any new system. So we
should not delude ourselves by assuming that adoption of a consumption tax
system will somehow automatically result in tax stability.
IV. THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX RULES
Let me say a few words about the U.S. tax rules for taxing cross-border
transactions by its citizens, residents, and corporations. The United States
employs a worldwide system of taxation of its citizens, residents, and domestic
corporations, and, thus, taxes such persons on their worldwide incomes. To
prevent international double taxation from interfering with efficiency enhancing
cross-border transactions, however, the United States grants a dollar-for-dollar
credit for foreign income taxes paid on foreign-source income. To prevent the
foreign tax credit from offsetting the U.S. tax on U.S.-source income or the
residual U.S. tax on low-taxed foreign-source income, the foreign tax credit is
subject to a complicated limitation provision, which limits the foreign tax credit
to the pre-foreign tax credit U.S. tax on various categories of foreign-source
income. The foreign tax credit provisions, including the limitations on the foreign
tax credit, are complicated, but they serve the important policy objective of
limiting the role of tax considerations in determining the location of investment.
If working properly, these rules should neither favor or disfavor foreign
investment by U.S. taxpayers; instead, the economics of the domestic versus
foreign investment opportunities should determine whether the taxpayer invests
at home or abroad.
33
One important defect in the current international tax rules is the concept of
international tax deferral for income earned abroad through a foreign subsidiary.
A U.S. person who conducts business abroad through an unincorporated branch,
limited liability company, partnership, or sole proprietorship must pay a current
tax on its foreign-source earnings, with a foreign tax credit for foreign taxes paid.
By contrast, a U.S. person who conducts business abroad through a foreign
subsidiary bears no U.S. tax on the foreign-source earnings until they are
repatriated to the United States through a distribution, i.e., the U.S. tax is
deferred until repatriation.'3 This deferral privilege creates a bias in favor of locating
business abroad in low-tax foreign countries and conducting that business through a
132. See Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing
Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 926-45 (1987); Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case Against
Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX REV. 645, 659-60 (2003).
133. The label that economists traditionally have put on this approach for taxing international
transactions is "capital export neutrality," and it is the approach that is most consistent with the economic theory
of comparative advantage that supports free trade.
134. See, e.g., CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI & RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, TAXATION
OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 399-400 (2d ed. 2001).
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foreign subsidiary. It can be thought of as a tax subsidy for U.S. multinationals'
operations abroad.'35 This deferral privilege is subject to a complicated set of anti-
deferral rules, which seek to end or cut back on deferral in situations involving mobile
passive income or business income having little connection with the country of
incorporation of the subsidiary (so-called "base company income").
Recent attention has focused on "corporate inversion" transactions as a
noteworthy example of the tax-avoidance planning opportunities that result from
the defects in our international tax rules.'3 6 There are several ways to accomplish
the inversion transaction, but the result is that a group of affiliated corporations
that formerly had a U.S. parent corporation at the top of the structure is changed
so that the ultimate parent of the corporate group is a publicly held foreign
corporation that is located in a low-tax or no-tax country.'37 The foreign parent
corporation is not subject to U.S. tax on its income (except to the extent that it
has U.S.-source income that is not exempt from U.S. tax under a U.S. tax treaty)
dind the U.S. public shareholders of the foreign parent corporation will not pay
tax on the foreign parent's income until the income is repatriated through
distributions from the foreign parent or until those shareholders sell their stock in
the foreign parent. (The foreign parent corporation is not a "controlled foreign
corporation" subject to the rules of Subpart F'38 because its share ownership is
widely dispersed. 39) The corporate group may further reduce its U.S. tax liability
135. In fact, the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation treats international tax deferral as a tax
expenditure and keeps track of the revenue loss from deferral as part of its tax expenditure budget. See STAFF
OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2004-2008, at 20
(Dec. 22, 2003) (estimating that the total tax expenditure cost of deferral of U.S. tax on active income of
controlled foreign corporations for 2004-2008 is $25 billion and the tax expenditure cost of deferral of U.S. tax
on certain active financing income is $8 billion). As a tax expenditure, the deferral privilege should undergo a
rigorous cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the costs of the subsidy exceeds its benefits and, if the
subsidy is justified, whether it makes sense to implement the subsidy through the tax system rather than through
a direct expenditure program.
136. For commentary on the corporate inversion problem, see Lorence L. Bravenec, Connecting the
Dots in U.S. International Taxation, 97 TAX NOTES 562 (2002); N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n Tax Sec., Outbound
Inversion Transactions, 96 TAX NOTES 127 (2002); Jim A. Seida & William F. Wempe, Market Reaction to
Corporate Inversion Transactions, 97 TAX NOTES 1098 (2002); Lee A. Sheppard, Preventing Corporate
Inversions, 95 TAX NOTES 29 (2002); Lee A. Sheppard, Preventing Corporate Inversions: Part 2, 95 TAX
NOTES 816 (2002); Lee A. Sheppard, Preventing Corporate Inversions: Part 3, 95 TAX NOTES 1864 (2002);
Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Thomas's Inversion Proposal: Short, Sweet, and Incomplete, 96 TAX
NOTES 192 (2002); Willard B. Taylor, Corporate Expatriations-Why Not?, 78 TAXES 146 (Mar. 2000);
Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., A Critical Perspective on the Thomas Bill, 96 TAX NOTES 581 (2002); Samuel C.
Thompson, Jr., The Non-Wimpy Grassley-Baucus Inversion Bill, 95 TAX NOTES 1515 (2002); Samuel C.
Thompson, Jr., Section 367: A 'Wimp'for Inversions and a 'Bully' for Real Cross-Border Acquisitions, 94 TAX
NOTES 1505 (2002); Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Treasury's Inversion Study Misses the Mark. 95 TAX NOTES
1673 (2002).
137. See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, CORPORATE INVERSION TRANSACTIONS: TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS 4-7
(May 2002).
138. See I.R.C. §§ 951-964. See generally I JOEL D. KUNTZ & ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION ch. B3 (1992).
139. See I.R.C. § 957(a) (defining a controlled foreign corporation as a foreign corporation more than 50
percent of the total voting power or total stock value of which is held by one or more U.S. shareholders holding
10 percent or more of the voting power).
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through so-called "earnings stripping" transactions, typically involving interest
and royalty payments from the U.S. subsidiary corporation to the foreign parent.
If everything goes according to plan, those payments will be deductible by the
U.S. subsidiary-payor (assuming they do not run afoul of the various limitations
on deductions, including, in the case of interest, the earnings stripping rules in
Section 163(j)) and will be exempt from U.S. tax or subject to a reduced rate of
U.S. tax in the hands of the foreign parent-payee if the foreign parent is
incorporated in a foreign country that is a U.S. treaty partner.
40
Although the Bush Administration and Congress determined in 2002 that
corporate inversions were a problem, they did nothing to solve the problem. One
of the Bush Administration's tax proposals in 2003 that did not get enacted
would have resulted in a "band aid" approach to dealing with the problem by
tightening the earnings stripping rules in Section 163(j), a change that I support
but believe does not go far enough. Incredibly, the Bush Treasury Department, in
its report on corporate inversions, blamed the inversion problem not on taxpayer
abuse of the system and ill-advised tax rules that operate to tax foreign-source
income too lightly, but instead on the failure of the U.S. international tax rules to
enhance the "competitiveness" of U.S. multinational corporations in the global
marketplace.' 4 1 Proponents of gutting the U.S. worldwide system of international
taxation are attempting to use this corporate inversion problem and the
FSC/extraterritorial income exclusion regimes fiasco in the WTO as a vehicle for
modifying the U.S. international tax rules in such a way as to reduce the already
low effective rate of tax on U.S. multinationals' foreign-source income.
The current U.S. international tax rules do require reform and simplification.
However, Congress and the Bush Administration seem to be moving in the
direction of gutting the foreign tax credit limitations in Section 904(d) by
reducing the number of foreign tax credit limitation baskets to two or three
categories and gutting the anti-deferral rules in Subpart F by enacting more
exceptions to their reach. They seem to be basing this move on their uncritical
acceptance of the claims made by U.S. multinationals and their lobbyists that the
current rules are putting U.S. multinational corporations at a competitive
disadvantage.' 42 This claim lacks strong empirical support and should not be the
140. See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, supra note 137, at 13.
141. See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, supra note 137, at 29-30. In fact, some of the language in this report reads
more like a brief in support of U.S. multinationals' arguments in favor of preferential tax treatment of foreign-
source income than an analytical report by the tax policy office of the U.S. Treasury Department. See, e.g., id. at
2 ("Both the recent inversion activity and the increase in foreign acquisitions of U.S. multinationals are
evidence that the competitive disadvantage caused by our international tax rules is a serious issue with
significant consequences for U.S. businesses and the U.S. economy."). For another critique of this Treasury
report, see Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Treasury's Inversions Report Rocks the Boat, 95 TAX
NoTEs 1289 (2002) ("Treasury reports are usually long on analysis and short on conclusions. The May 17
'preliminary' report on corporate inversion transactions seems to take the opposite tack.").
142. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 5, at G-I (summarizing then Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax
Policy Pamela Olson's attack on the current international tax rules as impairing the competitiveness of U.S.
corporations, in essence repeating the assertion of multinational corporate lobbyists, without citing any
empirical evidence for this assertion). The economic model supporting a move toward an exemption system or
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basis for reform and simplification of the international tax rules. The effect of
these proposed changes is to significantly reduce the effective U.S. tax rate on
foreign-source income and either further increase the budget deficit or make up
the lost revenue by shifting the tax burden to other types of income. This would
create a bias in favor of foreign investment. The proponents of such a move bear
a heavy burden to justify special treatment of foreign-source income under our
income tax system. Something more than unsupported and rather vague
assertions about "competitiveness" problems of U.S. multinationals should be
required before we further reduce the effective U.S. rate of taxation on the
foreign-source income of U.S. persons.1"'
Instead, I would favor a move toward shoring up our worldwide taxation
system. We should end deferral completely for income earned by a U.S. person
through a foreign corporation'" and we should tighten up the foreign tax credit
rules to ensure that they are mitigating double taxation but not eliminating U.S.
tax on low-taxed foreign-source income.' 41 We should also tighten up the
earnings stripping rules for interest in Section 163(j) and formulate treaty
amendments or statutory anti-abuse rules in the treaty context that prevent
taxpayers from using the treaties to reduce all tax on a transaction (rather than
merely eliminating double taxation) contrary to the intent of the treaty partners. 46
V. THE GROWING REACH OF THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAx PROVISIONS
One complicating feature of our current income tax system is the alternative
minimum tax provisions. These provisions were first enacted in much more
other statutory changes that reduce the U.S. taxation of foreign-source income is called "capital import
neutrality" or sometimes "competitiveness." It is based on the premise that the international tax rules should
focus on the ability of U.S. persons to compete in a particular foreign market. This approach to taxing
international transactions may have the effect of distorting economic behavior by encouraging taxpayers to shift
income and assets abroad to low-tax foreign countries.
143. In fact, some leading lobbyists for the tax position of multinational corporations have come to
understand that a properly designed exemption or territorial system for taxing foreign-source income would
actually raise more revenue than our current "compromise" international tax system and now favor retaining our
current international tax system, but with modifications that would weaken the reach of Subpart F and the
impact of the foreign tax credit limitations. See National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., The NFTC's Report on
Territorial Taxation, 27 TAX NOTES INT'L 687, 707 (2002) (concluding "that, on balance, legislative efforts to
improve current international tax rules are better spent on reform of our current deferral and foreign tax credit
system and on finding a WTO-compatible replacement for FSC/ETI than on adopting a territorial exemption
system").
144. See Peroni, supra note 129, at 989-90; J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay,
An Alternative View of Deferral: Considering a Proposal to Curtail, Not Expand, Deferral, 20 TAX NOTES
INT'L 525 (2000); Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing
Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455 (1999).
145. See, e.g., Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Reform and Simplification of
the U.S. Foreign Tax Credit Rules, 101 TAX NOTES 103 (2003); Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. &
Robert J. Peroni, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: "What's Source Got to Do With It?"--Source Rules and
U.S. International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81 (2002); Robert J. Peroni, A Hitchhiker's Guide to Reform of the
Foreign Tax Credit Limitation, 56 SMU L. REV. 391 (2003).
146. See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, supra note 137, at 24-25.
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limited form in 1969, and then considerably broadened and strengthened in 1982
and 1986.' Even as broadened in the 1980s, they were intended to apply to only
a small percentage of largely high-income individual taxpayers and corporations
who used an accumulation of tax preferences to reduce their federal income tax
liability to unacceptably low levels. They comprise a second, complicated
income tax system containing its own rules and rates, which stands side by side
with the regular income tax system. The existence of this shadow income tax
system is an admission by Congress of its failure to design a regular tax system
that accurately measures a taxpayer's net income. The alternative minimum tax
provisions take pressure off Congress to reform the regular income tax system.
Congress can leave the tax preferences in the Code and feel that it has
accomplished something by eliminating or scaling back the preferences for
alternative minimum tax purposes.
These provisions were enacted for a worthwhile purpose, namely, to prevent
high-income taxpayers from combining their tax preferences to reduce their
taxable income to an unacceptably low level. In effect, they operate as a check
against the overuse of tax preferences by any particular high-income taxpayer.
However, over the years, more and more taxpayers have become subject to these
provisions. Congress has enacted tax cuts and new tax preferences for regular tax
purposes without altering the minimum tax provisions. For example, the
enactment of the child credit in 1997 and the tax rate cuts in 2001 substantially
reduce over time many taxpayers' regular income tax liabilities. It is estimated
that if Congress makes no adjustment, approximately one-third of all taxpayers
will be subject to the alternative minimum tax provisions by the year 2010."8
Like the Blob in the classic horror film, these provisions threaten to overwhelm
and overtake the regular tax provisions'4 9 and undermine respect for the income
tax system. Intentionally or unintentionally these provisions threaten to nullify
the 2001 and 2003 rate cuts for many middle-income taxpayers. This will breed
public cynicism and foster disrespect for the federal income tax system.
Any permanent solution to this problem will be costly but needs to be done.
Subjecting large numbers of taxpayers (particularly middle-income taxpayers) to
the complications of the alternative minimum tax provisions threatens to
undermine public support for the tax system and is unacceptable. The partial and
temporary solution proposed by President Bush in his budget proposal is not
good enough. As a starting point, Congress should reduce the rates in the
individual alternative minimum tax provisions, increase the income level at which
the highest individual minimum tax rate kicks in, increase and index for inflation
147. Congress put more teeth into the alternative minimum tax in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
148. See Graetz, A Fresh Start, supra note 4, at 262; Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale & Jeffrey
Rohaly, By 2008, the AMT Will Cost More to Repeal than the Regular Income Tax, 96 TAX NOTES 1641 (2002).
149. One commentator has noted that this phenomenon may result in the alternative minimum tax
becoming "the flat tax rate for more and more Americans." Mark A. Luscombe, Alternative Minimum Tax-Our
Future Flat Tax?, 81 TAXES 3, 4 (Nov. 2003).
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the exemption amount, and make the child credit an allowable credit for alternative
minimum tax purposes on a permanent basis. Better yet, as persuasively argued by
other commentators,'5° the alternative minimum tax provisions should be repealed
altogether as part of a comprehensive income tax reform effort.'5 ' One complicated
tax system is more than enough and now is the time to take care of this problem.
Hopefully, other base-broadening moves undertaken as part of that tax reform
effort in the form of direct elimination and reduction of the underlying tax
preferences will undercut the theoretical justifications for the alternative minimum
tax.
VI. OVER-RELIANCE ON THE MYTH OF SELF-ASSESSMENT
We should be honest about our tax system and not delude ourselves into
thinking it is something it is not. Regardless of the base we choose for the tax-
income, consumption, or some hybrid-we have to recognize that some taxpayers
will try to avoid fulfilling their legal obligation to pay tax.'52 Undoubtedly some of
that noncompliance is attributable to the complexity of the current system. Some of
it also is attributable to concerns about the fairness of the tax system, i.e., taxpayers
not complying because they perceive that other taxpayers are engaging in
maneuvers (in many cases, legal maneuvers) to avoid paying tax. However, we
have to recognize that a good part of the noncompliance is intentional in nature-
taxpayers who know what they are doing is wrong but who nevertheless take their
chances in order to cheat the government. For example, one of the largest areas of
noncompliance is by self-employed individuals, who tend to underreport receipts
and overstate deductions."' Those self-employed who cheat on their taxes do so
because they believe that they can get away with it. By contrast, tax compliance by
employees who earn wages paid by employers is relatively high, largely because
150. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Tax Simplification and the Alternative Minimum Tax, 91 TAX NOTES
1455 (2001); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX
SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE OF 1986, VOLUME 1I: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON
TAXATION TO SIMPLIFY THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM 13-16 (Comm. Print Apr. 2001) (recommending the repeal
of both the individual and corporate alternative minimum tax provisions on the grounds that they are complex
and do not necessarily accurately measure a taxpayer's net income).
151. The only exception to this might be a revised alternative minimum tax provision based on a
comparison between a corporation's financial (i.e., "book") income and its income reported under for federal
income tax purposes. For example, a tax of 10 percent of the difference between the two figures could be added
to the corporation's regular tax liability. For a proposal to use adjusted book income as the tax base for public
corporations, see George K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson from History,
54 SMU L. REV. 209 (2001). For a discussion of the difficulties in using the traditional measures of book-tax
disparity to determine the magnitude of the corporate tax shelter problem, see George K. Yin, The Problem of
Corporate Tax Shelters: Uncertain Dimensions, Unwise Approaches, 55 TAX L. REV. 405 (2002). By contrast,
Michael Graetz has suggested that it might make more sense to repeal the regular tax and leave the alternative
minimum tax in place. See Graetz, A Fresh Start, supra note 4, at 302-03.
152. See Jerome Kurtz, Woodworth Lecture: Two Cheers for the Income Tax, 27 OHIo N.U. L. REV.
161, 172 (2001).
153. See, e.g., id.
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the income tax is essentially collected through withholding by the employer and
employees tend to have few expenses to deduct.
5 4
Thus, contrary to what some tax reform commentators assume (particularly
those who favor a shift to a consumption base),'55 fundamental tax reform will not
end the need for a well-funded and vigorous tax administrative agency. Adoption
of the Flat Tax or some other form of consumption tax will not change human
nature and will not end tax cheating. State and local sales taxes are low-rate,
typically single- or dual-rate, relatively simple tax systems that many Americans
perceive to be fair tax systems (however misguided that perception may be). Yet,
state and local sales tax evasion apparently is rampant. 1 6 A recent celebrated case
involved the government alleging sales tax evasion of $1 million on art purchase
of $13 million by the former chairman and chief executive officer of a major
public corporation.5 7 This noncompliance with the state sales tax provisions is
happening presumably because the parties involved believe that they can get
away with it, not because of any perceived unfairness of state and local sales
taxes.
This fact means that we must have resources devoted to enforcement and
expect the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to be vigorous in its enforcement of
the tax laws. The IRS and all of its employees should, of course, observe
taxpayers' constitutional rights and treat all taxpayers in a professional manner.
But the thought that the IRS should use a Nordstrom's-like approach to tax
collection and enforcement and treat tax cheats as customers is utterly absurd.
The IRS Restructuring Law enacted in 1998 achieved some desirable reforms but
it also had the effect of undercutting the enforcement efforts of the IRS. The fact
that this legislation is flawed should surprise no one. The legislation came out of
shameful Senate hearings in 1997 on IRS abuses, chaired by the late Senator
William Roth, in which taxpayers made unsubstantiated allegations against the
IRS without being required to waive taxpayer privacy rights as to their returns so
that the IRS could respond to the allegations. The hearings had the atmosphere of
a witch-hunt. The General Accounting Office later found that most of these
allegations of IRS abuse were unwarranted 58 but incalculable damage was done
to the public image of the IRS and to the morale of IRS personnel.
154. For many employees, the two-percent floor in section 67 for "miscellaneous itemized deductions"
disallows all or a significant part of most employees' unreimbursed employee business expenses. This reduction in
the potential for tax cheating by employees with respect to the deductions for unreimbursed employee business
expenses is one of the most important reasons that Congress enacted section 67.
155. See, e.g., HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 7, at 16 (stating that "perhaps someday the govemment
will recognize that lower tax rates are a better solution to taxpayer compliance than stricter enforcement").
156. See, e.g., Glenn R. Simpson, Jeff D. Opdyke & Ann Zimmerman, Sales-Tax Indictment Targets
Common Practice, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2002, at DI.
157. See, e.g., Mark Maremont & Jerry Markon, Ex-Tyco Chief Evaded $1 Million in Taxes on Art,
Indictment Says, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2002, at A1.
158. See, e.g., Amy Hamilton, Alleged IRS Harassment: No Misconduct Found in 95 Percent of Cases,
88 TAx NOTES 978 (2000); John D. McKinnon, Some IRS Abuse Charges Are Discredited, WALL ST. J., Apr.
25, 2000, at A2.
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This incident is part of a pattern of shameful conduct by various political
figures toward the IRS. Members of Congress often disingenuously refer to the
"IRS Code," instead of the Internal Revenue Code, implying that the IRS is the
originator of the Code and attempting to shift blame for the complexities and
inequities in the Code from the legislative branch to the administrative agency in
charge of administering the tax laws. Of course, Congress, not the IRS, has
enacted every provision of the tax code and Congress has the power to overturn
by legislation any regulation issued by the IRS that it does not like. Yet, it rarely
does so. Instead, members of Congress like to use the IRS as a "whipping boy" at
the same time they are pressuring the IRS to step up its revenue collection
efforts. Often, this anti-IRS rhetoric is employed by political figures to mask their
true aims-antagonism toward the government programs they have failed or are
unwilling to eliminate directly through spending cuts.'59
The IRS is understaffed and needs more resources to accomplish its enforcement
effort. This resource starvation of the tax enforcement system is a scandal that
threatens to undermine the tax system and our government. Whether we retain our
hybrid income tax system or move to more of a consumption tax base, we must have
vigorous enforcement efforts by the IRS, the government agency charged with
enforcement of the tax laws.
One last point bears mention. In recent years, IRS personnel have been under
pressure by lawmakers and by some high-ranking officials in the agency both to
engage in alternative dispute resolution and to settle more cases as a way of
increasing revenue and reducing administrative costs. In theory, this makes
sense. However, one must be careful not to set up a pattern where cases are
routinely settled for fifty cents or sixty cents on the dollar, even where the IRS
has a reasonable argument that the taxpayer's claimed tax treatment is erroneous.
Such a settlement pattern will encourage noncompliance and reduce the transaction
costs for aggressive taxpayers and their advisers to enter the audit lottery. It also
rewards those taxpayers who have the resources to engage high-cost, aggressive
practitioners to challenge IRS deficiencies, however reasonable they are, and,
because they are repeat players in the tax controversy setting, have an incentive
to do so.
VII. REINVIGORATION OF THE TAX EXPENDITURE CONCEPT
The late Professor Stanley Surrey of the Harvard Law School is primarily
responsible for the prominence of the tax expenditure concept in tax policy
analysis. The idea is that tax code provisions that have a programmatic purpose
(i.e., some economic or social policy purpose other than determining the
taxpayer's net income subject to tax) should be treated as government programs
159. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of Tax Protests and
Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819 (2002).
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that need to be identified, quantified, and evaluated under a rigorous cost-benefit
analysis. A significant purpose of the tax expenditure analysis is to bring
transparency to government programs advanced through the tax system, recognizing
that these indirect government programs often pass under the radar screen with far
less scrutiny than direct government programs receive. It has become fashionable in
academic ' ° and government circles ' to bash the tax expenditure concept as
outdated, simplistic, and lacking analytic value. Politicians of all philosophical
bents dislike the tax expenditure concept and like to use tax expenditure
provisions in the tax code to achieve various policy objectives. Liberals dislike
the tax expenditure concept because, if rigorously applied, it undercuts the ability
of legislators to use the tax system to achieve government programs. In an era of
budget deficits, when new direct government programs are very difficult to get
approved, tax expenditures may be the only way to get a program through the
Congress. Conservatives dislike the tax expenditure concept because they view
tax subsidies as involving less government bureaucracy and more taxpayer
autonomy than direct government programs. Conservatives also dislike the tax
expenditure concept because they argue that it is based on the erroneous
assumption that the government has a pre-existing claim on the taxpayer's
income and that any reduction in that claim is somehow suspect.162
These criticisms largely miss the point of the tax expenditure concept. The
major point is that if a government program to be administered through the tax
system is being proposed everyone ought to understand that is what is being done
and the program should undergo the same scrutiny as would any direct
government program. If the program cannot satisfy a rigorous cost-benefit
analysis, it should not be enacted or should be terminated if it has already been
enacted. Part of that calculus involves a serious determination of whether it
makes sense to accomplish the program through the tax system, rather than
through some other government mechanism. The fact that the government
program masquerades as a technical tax provision in a complicated tax bill
should not change the level of scrutiny that the proposed program will receive.
160. See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, The End of Tax Expenditures as We Know Them?, 92 TAX NOTES 413
(2001); Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244
(1969); Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L.
REV. 973 (1986); Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural
Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165 (1993).
161. See, e.g., ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL
YEAR 2004, 101-40 [hereinafter ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES] (in chapter on tax expenditures, the budget makes
clear the skepticism of the Bush Administration's Treasury Department toward the tax expenditure concept);
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 87-99 (in chapter on tax expenditures, the budget refers to "so-called"
tax expenditures of "questionable analytic value").
162. See, e.g., Heidi Glenn, Bush Administration Questions Value of Tax Expenditures List, 91 TAX
NOTES 535 (2001); Komhauser, supra note 159, at 896 n.218 (stating that "the tax expenditure concept implies
that the government, not the taxpayer, is entitled to that [revenue lost as a result of a tax expenditure provision]
under a normal income tax .... ). One commentator has described this argument as "peculiar." See Leonard E.
Burman, Is the Tax Expenditure Concept Still Relevant?, 56 NAT'L TAX J. 613, 620 (2003).
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The point is not that the taxpayer's income belongs to the government, but,
instead, that tax expenditures constitute funds spent on a government program
and ought to be carefully evaluated as such.
If sensibly applied, the tax expenditure concept can properly serve as a
constraining force on Congress's enactment of costly tax preferences aimed at
narrow constituencies. 163 In an era where tax deductions and credits are being
proposed for virtually every pet project of the President or members of
Congress,"M it has never been more necessary to have that constraining force
present. And the need for an effective tax expenditure-type analysis of tax
preferences will not disappear should we adopt a consumption-based tax
system, 65 although the baseline for applying the concept would change.
VIII. FINAL CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The case for scrapping our hybrid income tax system and replacing it with
some unproven consumption tax system has not been adequately made, at least as
a complete replacement for our current system. '66 Our current system still raises
more money than any other system in the world and is the envy of the world.
Rather than trying some new, unproven consumption tax system as the main
source of revenue for the federal government, we should continue the efforts to
substantially reform and simplify the income tax system that resulted in the
passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Instead of tearing the income tax system
out by its roots, we should prune and nurture it by reforming the income tax
system into a more broad-based system with lower rates. In this regard, the Bush
Administration's major tax proposals to date largely have been steps in the wrong
direction and signal the Administration's decision to abandon the income tax
system without proposing a properly designed consumption tax alternative in its
place. Instead of simplifying the tax system, they generally have added
tremendous complexity to it. Instead of preserving the progressive distribution of
the tax burden that was in place when the Bush Administration took office, these
proposals will result in a shift of the burden downward from high-income
163. See Burman, supra note 162, at 621.
164. This is a bipartisan problem. The Clinton Administration was notorious for its support of tax
preferences as a means of achieving non-revenue raising social or economic purposes. For example, the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, signed into law by President Clinton, was responsible for adding many new tax
preferences to the Code, thus increasing the complexity of the tax system.
165. For example, the distinction between personal activities and business or investment activities would
remain an important issue under a cash-flow consumption tax and the pressure on Congress to enact tax
preferences that treat expenses incurred in favored personal consumption activities as non-consumption
expenses for tax purposes would be as intense, if not more intense, under a cash-flow consumption tax system
as under our existing system.
166. As indicated earlier in this article, use of a consumption tax as a supplement to the income tax
system (e.g., as a vehicle for removing most lower- and middle-income taxpayers from the income tax system)
or as a replacement for the regressive employment taxes may indeed be a desirable policy option that deserves
serious consideration by policymakers.
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taxpayers to low- and middle-income taxpayers. Instead of reducing tax rates as
part of a program of base broadening of the income tax system or a program of
government spending reductions, these proposals have both reduced rates and
undermined the tax base, helping to produce budget deficits in place of the
budget surpluses of just three years ago.'6 Thus, the Bush Administration's tax
policies to date have not advanced the cause of tax reform but in fact impeded it.
167. Having failed to persuade low-, middle-, and even high-income taxpayers on the merits to oppose
popular government programs that require significant government spending to support them (such as Social
Security and Medicare), there are some members of Congress (e.g., Republican Representative Jim DeMint of
South Carolina) as well as editorial page writers (e.g., the Wall Street Journal editorial page) who have cynically
advocated a shifting of the tax burden downward apparently in an effort to generate antagonism toward government
programs. See Clarence Page, Bush reaches out to the "Needy," CHI. TRtB., Jan. 12, 2003, at 9. Representative
DeMint stated: "You can't maintain a democracy if the people who are voting don't care what their government
costs." Id. See also Robert J. Barro, Bush's Tax Cuts: Reaganomics Redux?, BUS. WK., Jan. 20, 2003, at 22 (stating
that "thus, more and more, the individual income tax has been paid primarily by the well off, creating a dangerous
political cleavage that promotes class warfare").
168. Of course, the Bush Administration's tax cuts in 2001 through 2003 are not the only cause of the
current budget deficits. The weak economy and resulting lower economic growth would have reduced government
revenues, even if the tax cuts had not been enacted. In fact, proponents of the Bush Administration's tax policies
argue that the tax cuts prevented the decline in revenue from being even greater by shoring up the economy during
the recession that occurred during the period 2001-02. Moreover, if the Bush Administration and Congress had
been more serious about restraining government spending, the deficits would have been smaller in amount.
Increased government spending is obviously a major contributor to these budget deficits. In any event, although
there is some disagreement among economists concerning the economic effects of budget deficits of the type
arising in the United States in recent years, it seems reasonably clear that sustained budgets deficits reduce national
saving and future national income. See William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Economic Effects of Sustained Budget
Deficits, 56 NAT'L TAx J. 463 (2003).
